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Throughout its history, the development of international law has been
influenced by the requirements of international life ....
I. INTRODUCTION
While the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts prepared by
the International Law Commission (ILC) in December 2001,2 only re-
cently did the ILC decide to include the topic of "Responsibility of
international organizations" in its long-term work program.3 Although
the International Law Association (ILA) has been considering the ac-
countability of international organizations through its Committee on the
Accountability of International Organizations, established in May 1996,'
1. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).
2. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 83, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). See generally THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION,
TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (James Crawford ed., 2002) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY].
3. U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the International Law, Fifty-Second Session, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 292, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000).
4. In this Article, by "international organization" we refer to an intergovernmental
organization as defined in article 2(l)(i) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
article 2 (1)(i) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or between International Organizations. Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2(l)(i), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679;
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations, March 21, 1986, art. 2(l)(i), 25 I.L.M. 543. In May
1996, the International Law Association's Executive Council decided to establish a Committee
on Accountability of International Organizations [hereinafter ILA Committee]. The first report
of the Committee was presented to the 68th Conference of the ILA in Taipei in 1998 and laid
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the timing of the ILC's decision to include the topic was related to the
completion of its state responsibility project in 2001.5 Article 57 of the
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
provides: "These articles are without prejudice to any question of the
responsibility under international law of an international organization, or
of any state for the conduct of an international organization.' '6 The key
element in the conception of state responsibility developed under the
ILC's project was, in the words of James Crawford, "the abandonment of
an exclusively synallagmatic conception of responsibility, 7 i.e., the re-
sponsibility of one state to another state.
The legal personality of international organizations could no longer
be seen as a demarche for member states to avoid joint and several re-
sponsibility for their conduct.8 It would be "fantastic" to assume that
international organizations "are authorized to violate the principles they
were established to serve" and it would "be perverse, even destructive, to
postulate a community expectation that lOs [international organizations]
need not conform to the principles of public order."9 It is now clear that
the legal personality of international organizations entails a responsibil-
ity for their conduct. These developments have sharpened focus on the
relationships of an international organization with its member states,
out the general themes that were appropriate for study and consideration. See ILA Report of
the Sixty-Eighth Conference, Taipei, May 24-30, 1998, Report of the International Law Asso-
ciation Committee on Accountability of International Organizations, 584 [hereinafter First
Report]. The second report presented to ILA's 69th Conference in London in 2000 discussed
relevant general principles. ILA Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, London, July 25-29,
2000, Report of the International Law Association Committee on Accountability of Interna-
tional Organizations, 878 [hereinafter Second Report]. The third report consolidated, revised,
developed, and expanded the second report's "recommended rules and practices." ILA Report
of the Seventieth Conference, New Delhi, Apr. 2-6, 2002 Report of the International Law
Association Committee on Accountability of International Organization, 772 [hereinafter
Third Report]. The ILA's 71st Conference in Berlin in August 2004 adopted the Final Report
of the Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations. ILA Report of the
Seventy-First Conference, Berlin, Aug. 16-21, 2004 Report of the International Law Associa-
tion Committee on Accountability of International Organizations, available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/pdf/Accountability/Final%20Report%202004.pdf (last visited Aug. 5 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Final Report].
5. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 2; THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2.
6. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COtrMISSION's ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 2, at 311, It 4-5 (providing commentary to article 57).
7. JAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM 29 (2002).
8. Id. at 20, 30: ("[Olne might say that public international organizations were entities
created by states with a view to avoiding joint and several liability."). But see International Tin
Council Appeals, 3 ALL E.R. 257, 307 (1988). For analysis, see C.F. Amerasinghe, Liability to
Third Parties of Member States of International Organizations: Practice, Principle and Judi-
cial Precedent, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1991).
9. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations: Quis Cus-
todiet Ipsos Custodies, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 131, 133-34 (1981).
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other international organizations, and third parties, and have clarified
different forms and ranges of accountability of international organiza-
tions. '°
Given the reality of international life in which international organiza-
tions participate, there are inevitably many facets to their accountability.
As the First Report of the ILA's Committee of Accountability of Interna-
tional Organizations stated, "Accountability is not a notion which, for the
sake of its operationality, is or has to be viewed as monolithic, calling for
uniform and indiscriminate application. Such rigidity would not survive
the complexities of international reality."" Instead, accountability is multi-
faceted, with various degrees of consequences ranging from oversight,
monitoring, and evaluation processes to censorship or other forms of
sanctions to the attribution of legal liability for injuries, resulting in
binding remedial action.2
As international organizations expand their roles and activities in an
ever-increasing number of areas of international life, there is a corre-
sponding expansion of responsibility for their interactions with an
equally increasing number of other nonstate entities like individuals,
groups of individuals, transnational corporations, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, minorities, and indigenous peoples. These nonstate entities
are also claiming "their particular legal position[s] within the ambit of
international law."' 3 International organizations "must, therefore, also be
deemed subject to a commensurately expanded reach of general or cus-
tomary international law,"' 4 and the rights and duties of any of these
organizations "must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified
or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice."'5
One of the most tangible results of these developments is the estab-
lishment of inspection functions or accountability mechanisms for
10. See, e.g., the First Report, Second Report, Third Report, and Final Report, supra
note 4; U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations:
Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/532 (2003); U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Sec-
ond Report on Responsibility of International Organizations: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/541 (2004); U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the International
Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 1153-54, U.N. Doc. A/58/10
(2003); and U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 71-72, U.N. Doc. A/59/10, (2004).
11. First Report, supra note 4, at 598.
12. Id. at5.
13. Id. at 596.
14. Ginther Handl, The Legal Mandate of Multilateral Development Banks as Agents
for Change toward Sustainable Development, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1998), reprinted in
GUNTHER HANDL, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKING: ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND CONCEPTS REFLECTING GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 26 (2001).
15. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, supra note 1,
at 180 (emphasis added).
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multilateral development banks (MDBs), allowing third parties to file
complaints regarding violations of a bank's internal policies and proce-
dural requirements in designing, processing, or implementing MDB-
assisted projects.'6 However remarkable this development in demanding
accountability of MDBs may be, banks still consider accountability
mechanisms as internal governance tools for enhancing the operational
effectiveness and discipline of the organization. As such, the question of
accountability remains, strictly speaking, within the purview of the or-
ganization's internal law. Even so, it has become part of broader
questions of international organizations' responsibility under interna-
tional law. As GUnther Handl remarked:
While each MDB's inspection procedure will ostensibly focus on
whether the existing operational policies and procedures have
been followed with regard to bank-financed projects, at the end
of the day, it will call attention also to the very existence of in-
ternational obligations incumbent upon the MDB concerned and
to the degree to which these obligations are reflected in the insti-
tution's by-laws and policies in the first place."
This Article will focus on the development of access for third par-
ties, particularly private individuals, to lodge claims against MDBs for
noncompliance with their policies and procedures. Part II briefly reviews
the overall context of the establishment of accountability of MDBs in the
global decision process. Part III analyzes the adequacy of the current
legal regime for the determination of responsibility of international or-
ganizations. Part IV postulates the substantive and procedural principles
for setting up an MDB accountability mechanism, examines how private
individuals and groups can lodge complaints against MDBs, and ana-
lyzes the limitations on such access. Part V examines the emerging
treatment of private individual access to MDBs' operational activities by
analyzing new developments in the structure of an accountability
mechanism. Finally, the Article recommends an institutional innovation
to allow each MDB's administrative tribunal to function as a special tri-
bunal.
16. For the most comprehensive accountability mechanism of MDBs, see ADB, Review
of the Inspection Function: Establishment of a New ADB Accountability Mechanism, ADB
Doc. R79-03 (May 8, 2003) [hereinafter New ADB Accountability Mechanism], available at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Poticies/ADBAccountabilityMechanism/
ADB-accountability-mechanism.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). See also IBRAHIM F. I. SHI-
HATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2000); DANIEL D.
BRADLOW, STUDY ON AN INSPECTION FUNCTION FOR THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
GROUP (2003).
17. HANDL, supra note 14, at 4 (emphasis added).
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I. THE CONTEXT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
OF MDBs IN THE GLOBAL DECISION PROCESS
International organizations are just one of many nonstate groupings
and associations created by individuals, including political parties, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), pressure groups, and private
associations, that compose a larger global community. All of these enti-
ties engage in activities transcending territorial boundaries. These
interdependent activities within and across global social processes stimu-
late, affect, and are affected by decision processes. "8 However
interdependent and interdeterminant this global community process may
be in its decision structures and procedures, it still exhibits mutual toler-
ance and reciprocity among states and other relevant actors, who may, by
a ddoublement fonctionnel, be claimants in one case and sit as deci-
sionmakers in the next comparable case.' 9 In areas where legal norms
and principles are incipient, the conduct of states and other relevant non-
state actors on the international plane shapes the contours of a general
practice to be accepted as law. MDBs are decisionmakers in this global
process, and choices relating to the accountability of MDBs perforce
reflect the basic decision structures and procedures of international law.2'
A. Immunities of International Organizations and Accountability
International organizations enjoy certain immunities and privileges
in the conduct of their operations. A member state's jurisdiction and, in
particular, the host state's jurisdiction do not extend to them. As a result,
international civil servants working within these international organiza-
tions have no recourse to third party dispute settlement mechanisms
outside their organizations. 22 Externally, third parties-individuals and
other relevant entities, including groups and NGOs-who are affected by
international organizations' operations have no effective access to offi-
18. For detailed description, see Myres S. McDougal, Michael Reisman, & Andrew R.
Willard, The World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807
(1988). These interdependencies are minutely described in MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3-93 (1980).
19. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARD 171-220, 221-264, 637-673 (1971).
20. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS:
A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 48 n. 125 (1962).
21. See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS 191 (Myres S.
McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REIS-
MAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
WORLD COMMUNITY (1981).
22. See generally, MICHAEL B. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT RE-
LATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1967).
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cial fora in which to file complaints and seek appropriate remedies. Con-
sequently, even though accountability of international organizations is "a
legitimate concern for the variety of actors on the international 
scene, 2 3
it has remained "a goal which may require a rather substantial degree of
progressive development."24
To overcome the immunities of international organizations from lo-
cal jurisdiction, the United Nations and its related specialized agencies
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the UN system organizations) es-
tablished their respective international administrative tribunals to address
employment-related disputes between staff and employers." In contrast,
the Bretton Woods organizations, in which the member states' sharehold-
ing (as determined by their amount of capital subscription) influences
decisionmaking, have taken a different path in terms of transparency and
accountability. Their special character sets them apart from the rest of
the UN system organizations. For example, the World Bank and the IMIF
justified their lack of information disclosure on the basis of the nature of
their work with sensitive macroeconomic and financial policy questions
of member states. 26 Their status as specialized agencies under Article 57
23. First Report, supra note 4, at 587.
24. Id; Konrad Ginther, International Organizations, Responsibility, in 2 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1336, 1339 (1988) ("The current legal situation reveals
that efforts at endowing international organizations with the status of international legal sub-
jects which have a responsibility of their own provide for a generally acceptable balance of
risk, but these efforts have only partially successful. The law on the responsibility of interna-
tional organizations is still in a state of flux.").
25. In its Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Awards, the ICJ observed:
[I]t would in the opinion of the Court hardly be consistent with the express aim of
the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individuals and the constant preoc-
cupation of the United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should
afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any dis-
pute which may a rise between it and them.
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Ad-
visory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 57 (July 13). See C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 329-32 (1996). See also C.F
AMERASINGHE, 1 & 2 THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE: As APPLIED BY IN-
TERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS (1988).
26. The IMF's archives policy was modified in 1999, and the access that had been de-
nied was allowed for executive board documents that are five years old and other documents
that are 20 years old (except for strictly confidential and secret material); see IMF Decision
No. 11915 (99/23) (Mar. 8, 1999). See also Publication Policies of the Fund, Decision No.
12405 (01/02) (Jan. 4, 2001). The IMF reviewed its transparency policy in 2002 and 2003. See
The Fund's Transparency Policy, Issues and Next Steps (Sept. 12, 2003); The Fund's Trans-
parency Policy, Issues and Next Steps (Feb. 12, 2004) (Amendments to the Transparency
Policy Decision), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pdr/trans/2004/021204.htm (last
visited Aug. 5, 2005). The World Bank adopted its policy on disclosure of information in
March 1994, which was revised extensively in August 2001. See The World Bank Policy on
Disclosure of Information (June 2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/operations/
disclosure/documents/disclosurepolicy.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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of the UN Charter notwithstanding, neither the World Bank nor the IMF
made use of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal or the ILO Ad-
ministrative Tribunal." Only in 1979, after the enormous expansion of its
operations and the deterioration of staff morale, did the World Bank es-
tablish an administrative tribunal to satisfy the basic international human
right of due process.2 8
In response to the need to serve the interests of both staff and the
administration of the organization, many other MDBs followed suit in
setting up independent judicial bodies during the 1980s and 1990s to
resolve internal disputes. 9
B. MDBs and the Global Decision Process
The IMF and the World Bank, established as global financial institu-
tions, are organized on the basis of each member's capital subscription to
the financial resources of the organization. The institutions weigh each
member's voting power according to the size of its capital subscription,
as opposed to the equal one-vote-per-member system of the United Na-
tions. 30 The subsequent organization of regional MDBs basically
patterned after the World Bank.3' The Asian Development Bank (ADB),
27. Andrfs Rigo Sureda, Process Integrity and Institutional Independence in Interna-
tional Organizations: The Inspection Panel and the Sanctions Committee of the World Bank,
in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 165,
168-69 (L. de Chazoumes, et al. eds., 2002). See also C.F. Amerasinghe, The World Bank
Administrative Tribunal, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 748, 750 (1982).
28. For a discussion of major reasons for the establishment of the World Bank Adminis-
trative Tribunal, see Amerasinghe, supra note 27, at 748-52.
29. See, e.g., AMERASINGHE, supra note 25, at 452-65; HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NILES
M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 641-47 (3rd ed. 1995). For a relation-
ship between international organizations and the administrative tribunals they belong to, see
Eisuke Suzuki, The Review and Repudiation of Judgments of International Administrative
Tribunals, 7 ASIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 206 (1997).
30. See generally, EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE
BRETTON WOODS (1973); KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND Evo-
LUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 71-114 (1982); JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS
292 (1979). See also Dennis Leech & Robert Leech, Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Insti-
tutions (2005), at http://www.warwick.ac.uk/-ecracALeechPower BWI.pdf (last visited Aug. 5,
2005) (a paper presented to the Development Studies Association Conference, Glasgow, Sept.
10-12, 2003).
31. The regional MDBs referred to in this Article are the Inter-American Development
Bank set up by the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, available
at http://www.idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=555080 (last visited Aug.
5, 2005) [hereinafter IDB Charter]; the Asian Development Bank set up by the Agreement
Establishing the Asian Development Bank, available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/
Reports/Charter/charter.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter ADB Charter]; the African
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the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), with their operational domains in Asia and the Pacific, Africa,
Central and Eastern Europe, and Central and South America, respectively,
are conventionally called regional development banks, even though each
organization's membership extends beyond the geographical scope of its
operational domain to North America, Western Europe, Japan, and Aus-
tralasia. Accordingly, each regional development bank and the World
Bank count the same industrialized countries as their members and pro-
vide representation for these countries on their respective Boards of
Executive Directors. As a result, what is happening in one institution is
likely to also take place in another institution because the sources of ex-
ternal demands are basically the same. Because industrialized member
states are more influential and larger shareholders of, or contributors to,
the financial resources of MDBs, it is unlikely these banks will ignore
the decisions of G-7 Finance Ministers .
In the global decision process, MDBs are not only decisionmakers in
promoting, prescribing, and applying their preferred policies. Because
the weighted voting power of MDBs is a fundamental watershed separat-
ing them from other international organizations, these banks also provide
arenas for decision for their most powerful member states.
The events that led to the creation of the World Bank's Inspection
Panel illustrate this global decision process. NGOs played a significant
role as decisionmakers in a long history of campaigns against the Bank
for increased accountability and information disclosure3  regarding its
visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter AfDB Charter]; and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development set up by the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/insti/basic/basicl.htm (last visited
Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter EBRD Charter].
32. See, e.g., Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers, Halifax, Nova Scotia (June 15,
2002), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm06l502.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2005); STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS, REPORT OF G-7 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVER-
NORS (2001), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm0l0707.htm (last visited Aug.
5, 2005); Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Palermo, Italy
(Feb. 17, 2001), at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm200lO2l7.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2005). See also John Williamson & C. Randall Hening, Managing the Monetary System, in
MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY FIFr'Y YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 83, 102-06 (Peter B.
Kenen ed., 1994). The United States, having 17.46% of the total quota (representing 17.14%
of the total voting power in the IMF as of July 11, 2005), has a sole veto power, in that any
major decision calls for a majority of at least 85% of the total voting power. GOLD, supra note
30, at 317. See also Eisuke Suzuki, The Fallacy of Globalism and the Protection of National
Economies, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 319 (2001).
33. See LORI UDALL, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: A THREE YEAR REVIEW,
ch. 1 (1997).
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ineffective implementation of or non-adherence to its policies. 4 This his-
tory started with the long grassroots campaign and public debate over the
Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) Project in India between 1985 and 1993,
which culminated in the creation of an independent commission headed
by Bradford Morse, former U.S. Congressman and Director of the United
Nations Development Programme, to undertake an independent review."
Faced with growing criticism of its project management and operations
performance, the World Bank established a Portfolio Management Task
Force36 that produced the report, "Effective Implementation: Key to De-
velopment Impact" (the Wapenhans Report) in 1992. The Wapenhans
Report critically evaluated the World Bank's performance by noting that it
deemed 37.5 percent of its projects completed in 1991 as failures, up
from 15 percent in 1981 and 30.5 percent in 1989. 37 Wapenhans summed
up his views of the World Bank's performance: "There is a declining
trend in project performance... and the [World] Bank is contributing to
it because of the presence of an approval culture.
38
In response to the Wapenhans Report's recommendations, the World
Bank concluded in its action plan that "the interest of the Bank would be
better served by the establishment of an independent Inspection Panel"
with a view to augmenting the Bank's existing supervision, audit, and
evaluation functions.39
34. These projects included the Polonoreste project in Brazil, the Yacyreta Hydroelec-
tric Project in Argentina and Paraguay, the Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation
Project in Indonesia, the Narmada River Development (Gujarat) Sardar Sarovar Dam and
Power Project in India, and the Narmada River Development (Gujarat) Water Delivery and
Drainage Project in India [hereinafter Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) Project]. See UDALL, supra
note 33, at 5. See also Augustinus Rumansara, Indonesia: The Struggle of the People of
Kedung Ombo, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY-THE WORLD BANK, NGOs AND
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 123-49 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 2000).
35. UDAL, supra note 33.
36. Report of the World Bank's Portfolio Management Task Force, Effective Implemen-
tation: Key to Development Impact, R92-125, (Nov. 3, 1992). See also SHIHATA, supra note
16, at 2-4.
37. Report of the World Bank's Portfolio Management Task Force, supra note 36, at ii.
In a candid evaluation of the World Bank's lending procedures, the report said that many prob-
lems stemmed from the World Bank's failure to ascertain actualflow of benefits or to evaluate
the sustainability of projects during their operational phase. Id. at iv.
38. World Bank, Summary of Oral History Transcript, Willi A. Wapenhans
(Aug. 19, 1993) (emphasis added), at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/OjjpagePK:34991 -theSitePK:29506-menuPK:35063-conte
ntMDK:20042044,00.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
39. World Bank, Portfolio Management: Next Step, A Program of Actions, at 60 (July
22, 1993). See also SHIHATA, supra note 16, at 3. As the General Counsel of the World Bank
witnessed, "[t]he creation of an operations inspection function in the World Bank came as a
response to a new Bank Management's concerns with the efficiency of the Bank's work." Id.
at 1.
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Important occasions for members of significant voting power to ex-
ercise their influence include the periodic meetings called to negotiate
the replenishment of concessional development funds such as the Inter-
national Development Association (IDA),4 the Asian Development Fund
(ADF),4' and the African Development Fund (AfDF).42 As one commen-
tator remarked:
There can be little doubt in the mind of anyone involved in a
MDF [Multilateral Development Fund] replenishment negotia-
tion of the powerful role played by the Deputies in decisively
influencing the direction and content of MDB operational, fi-
nancial, and even internal administrative policies. They do so by
conditioning their support and the periodic contributions of their
governments on being satisfied that their own donor condition-
alities and priorities-often subtly and sometimes not so subtly
expressed during replenishment negotiations-as to what the
MDBs (and not just the MDFs) will do, how they will do it and
how they are to be run, will be met by MDB managements.
43
IDA's 10th replenishment negotiation process in 1992 served as a
further vehicle for the promotion of accountability." The Morse Com-
mission's report, issued in June 1992, and the Wapenhans report,
released in November 1992, contributed to this global decision process.
Both reports reinforced NGO proposals for an independent mechanism
to allow adversely affected people to air their grievances on a World
Bank-assisted project.
The establishment of the World Bank's Inspection Panel in late
199345 was an extraordinary development that further underpinned the
transparency and accountability of MDBs. Never before had any entity
independent of the governing organs of an international organization
existed to hear and investigate complaints filed by private individuals
40. PERCY S. MISTY, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 86-90 (1995).
41. Id. at 93-96.
42. Id. at 90-93.
43. Id. at 118. See also IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL PAPERS 564
(2000).
44. MisTY, supra note 40, at 118. See also SHIHATA, supra note 16, at 4.
45. See International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, I.B.R.D. Res. 93-10
(Sept. 22, 1993); International Development Association, IDA Res. 93-6 (Sept. 22, 1993),
available at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf/WRelease/A31199D3AlAFBCOE
8525690000682B79 (last visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter World Bank Inspection Panel Reso-
lution]. The two Resolutions are identical and are reprinted in World Bank, World Bank
Operational Manual: Bank Procedures, 17.55, annex A (1997) and in SHIHATA, supra note 16, at
271.
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and groups affected by the organization.46 Although the Inspection
Panel's mandate only includes the examination of the World Bank's
compliance with its policies and procedures, it allows third parties to
participate in the decision-making process of the organization for the
first time. This development has fundamentally altered the relationship
between international organizations on the one hand and private indi-
viduals and groups on the other.
The ripple effect on the global decisionmaking process of having the
same major shareholders in each of the MDBs is evident in this context.
When the World Bank began preparing its action plan in 1993, ADB ap-
pointed the Task Force on Improving Project Quality in April 1993 to
review ADB's portfolio of projects.47 The report of the Task Force mir-
rored many of the findings of the Wapenhans Report.48 IDB followed the
World Bank in 1994 by establishing its own independent investigation
mechanism, which consisted of a permanent roster of individuals to con-
duct investigations.49As IDA's 10th replenishment negotiation process
was under way, ADB successively adopted policies on Confidentiality
and Disclosure of Information in September 1994,50 Governance in
46. See SHIHATA, supra note 16; David Hunter, Using the World Bank Inspection Panel
to Defend the Interests of Project-Affected People, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 201 (2003).
47. ADB, Report of the Task Force on Improving Project Quality, ADB Doc. Sec. M14-
94, at 2 (Mar. 14, 1994), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Project-Quality/
project-quality.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
48. The Task Force found inter alia: (i) Practices placed excessive emphasis on achiev-
ing annual levels of programmed lending, creating an "approval culture," which can result in
inadequate project design and insufficient consideration of local needs, demands, and absorp-
tive capacities; (ii) Full "ownership" of projects by DMCs was often lacking as a result of
their insufficient involvement in project design and their inadequate commitment of financial
and human resources; (iii) ADB accorded project administration less importance than project
processing, a byproduct of the approval culture; and (iv) ADB had not fully utilized feedback
on the lessons of past experiences in programming, project design, and implementation activi-
ties. Id. at 33-37, 1 99-114.
49. IDB, IDB's Independent Investigation Mechanism (1IM), at http://www.iadb.org/
aboutus/iii/independent invest/ independent invest.cfm?language+english (last visited Aug. 5,
2005). See also the rules and procedures of IDB's IIM, at http://www.iadb.org/cont/poli/
mechanism.pdf (visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter IDB IIM Rules and Procedures].
50. ADB, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information, ADB Doc. R134-94 (Aug. 18,
1994); ADB, Information Policy and Strategy of Asian Development Bank, ADB Doc. R143-
94 (Aug. 26, 1994). These two policies were replaced by ADB, The Public Communications
Policy of the Asian Development Bank, ADB Doc. RIO1-05 (Apr. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/PCP/PCP-R-Paper.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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October 1995,5' and the Establishment of the Inspection Function in
December 1995.52
The other MDBs came to organize similar systems: the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment and Guaran-
tee Agency (MIGA), in 1999, with the Office of the Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman;53 EBRD, in 2003, with its Independent Recourse
Mechanism; 4 and AfDB, in June 2004, with its Independent Review
Mechanism. 5  ADB's new Accountability Mechanism replaced its 1995
Inspection Function56 in 2003.
With increased participation in the global decision process from
nonstate entities like NGOs, demands for, and policies on, transparency,
accountability, and participation expanded globally. Accountability has
thus become the necessary complement to the principle of good govern-
58ance.
51. ADB, Governance: Sound Development Management, ADB Doc. R151-95 (Aug.
17, 1995), available at http://www.adb.org/documents/policies/governance/govpolicy.pdf (last
visited Aug. 5, 2005).
52. See ADB, Establishment of an Inspection Function, ADB Doc. R225-95 (Nov. 10,
1995), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Inspection/inspection-policy.pdf
(last visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter 1995 Inspection Function].
53. IFC/MIGA's Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). See also Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman
(CAO), Operational Guidelines (April 2004), at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/CAO%
200perational%2OGuidelines%20english%203-31-FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
54. EBRD, Independent Recourse Mechanism: As Approved by the Board of Directors
on 29 April 2003 (2003), at http://www.ebrd.com/about/imi/about/irm.pdf (last visited Aug. 5,
2005); EBRD, Independent Recourse Mechanism Rules of Procedure: As Approved by the
Board on 6 April 2004 (2004), at http://www.ebrd.com/about/irm/about/procedur.pdf (last
visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter EBRD IRM Rules of Procedure].
55. In June 2004, AfDB's Board of Directors approved a resolution [hereinafter AfDB
IRM Resolution] to establish an independent compliance review and problem-solving mecha-
nism [hereinafter AfDB Independent Review Mechanism]. In June 2004, AfDB's Board of
Directors also approved AfDB's Compliance Review and Mediation Unit of the Independent
Review Mechanism Operating Rules and Procedures [hereinafter AJDB IRM Operating Rules
and Procedures].
56. 1995 Inspection Function, supra note 52. The 1995 Inspection Function, modeled
after the IDB's mechanism, did not effectively handle its first full-scale inspection case involv-
ing the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project in Thailand. For a discussion of this
case, see Kenji Fukuda, Critical Analysis of the New Accountability Mechanism of the Asian
Development Bank, in Focus AsIEN No. 16: A HANDBOOK ON THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK: THE ADB AND ITS OPERATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PAciFic REGION 31 (Dorothy Guer-
rero ed., 2003).
57. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 144.
58. See First Report, supra note 4, at 601-02. The Commission on Global Governance
has defined "good governance" as "a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal insti-
tutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal
arrangements...." OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD 2 (The Conn'n on Global Governance
ed., 1995).
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III. THE LEGAL REGIME FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
There is no question that international organizations are subjects of
international law 9 and "as such," in the words of the ICJ in the WHO
case, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under gen-
eral rules of international law, under their constitutions or under
international agreements to which they are parties., 6' Efforts to assess the
international responsibility, tortious or otherwise, of international or-
ganizations in general, and MDBs in particular, under international law
encounter two basic obstacles. One is the state of the existing applicable
law and the other is the structure of arbitration for settlement of disputes.
A. The Applicable Law of International Organizations
1. General Framework
There are essentially five kinds of relationships that international or-
ganizations fashion in carrying out their respective functions at various
levels of operations: the organization's relationship with (i) its member
states; (ii) its staff; (iii) its non-member states and other international
organizations; (iv) nonstate private entities under contracts; and (v) other
third parties, i.e., private individuals and groups. For each category of
relationship, different sets of law will apply.
Within the international organization, the basic constituent instru-
ment of the organization, general international law, the headquarters
agreement with the host state, and the internal law of the organization
govern its relationship with its member states in the conduct of its opera-
tions. An MDB's relationship with its borrowing member countries
under any project financing is governed by general international law, the
respective loan and technical assistance agreements, and any other
59. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, supra note 1.
But the powers of international organizations are subject to the "principle of speciality." The
ICJ opined:
[T]o ascribe to the WHO the competence to address the legality of the use of nu-
clear weapons ... would be tantamount to disregarding the principle of speciality;
for such competence could not be deemed a necessary implication of the Constitu-
tion of the Organization in the light of the purposes assigned to it by its member
States.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 66, 79, 25 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icwww/icases/ianw/
ianwframe.htm.
60. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt,
Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter WHO case].
61. Id. at 89-90, 37.
[Vol. 27:177
Responsibility of International Organizations
project agreements, as well as the applicable law governing the relation-
ship with its member states.62 Since the relationship between the
organization and its staff is contractual, the internal law of the organiza-
tion, particularly its staff regulations and the particular employment
contract concerned, is the primary legal framework in which the rights
63and duties of the organization are determined vis-A-vis its employees.
Outside the organization, general international law and bilateral
agreements with non-member states and other international organiza-
tions govern its relationships. Local law, subject to the headquarters
agreement with the host state, and contracts regulate the organization's
relationship with private entities.
The MDB's relationship with third parties depends on its degree of
responsibility. The questions of accountability and transparency of an
MDB primarily arise in areas where its relationship with member states
conjoins with its external relations with private individuals and groups of
member states. 6' In these areas, the applicable law of international or-
ganizations varies depending on the circumstances of interaction and the
nature of activities, and different kinds of responsibility and legal conse-
quences will ensue.65
Many activities undertaken or contracted out by an international or-
ganization in the host state are subject to local law. Article III, section
(7)(b) of the headquarters agreement between the United Nations and the
United States, which is the genesis of most headquarters agreements for
international organizations, illustrates the relationship of international
organizations with local law. It states, "Except as otherwise provided in
this agreement or in the General Convention, the federal, state and local
law of the United States shall apply within the headquarters district."
66
This provision must, in turn, be read in conjunction with both the Char-
ter of the United Nations and the Convention on Privileges and
62. The immunity of an MDB does not extend to "the exercise of its powers to borrow
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities." ADB
Charter, supra note 31, art. 50.1.
63. de Merode v. World Bank, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep., Decision No. 1, at
27-28 (1981).
64. For a discussion on the need to restrict the scope of immunity of an international
organization, see Emmanuel Gaillard & Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, International Organisations
and Immunity from Jurisdiction: to Restrict or to Bypass, 51 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1 (2002).
65. The difficulty of MDBs' relationship with private parties in the territories of DMCs
are compounded by their respective relationship with member states since the essence of the
legal relationship as a host state and an international organization is "a body of mutual obliga-
tions of cooperation and good faith." WHO case, supra note 60, at 93, 43.
66. Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, 11
U.N.T.S. 11.
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Immunities of the United Nations, 7 which safeguard the full and inde-
pendent exercise of the organization's operations, administration, and
performance of its functions by recognizing a rulemaking or regulatory
competence within the headquarters seat. The United Nations "has never
recognized Article III, Section 7(b) of the Headquarters Agreement as
imposing local law upon contracts concluded at the Headquarters. 68 All
MDBs follow the same practice.
For implementing the responsibility of international organizations,
the applicable law in the contractual relations between an international
organization and private parties is the contract concerned and general
principles of both public and private international law. 69 The importance
in international law of the contract, both qua contract and, in a sense,
qua legal system, cannot be overstated. In the Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO
arbitration,7° the tribunal held that "the Concession has the nature of a
constitution which has the effect of conferring acquired rights on the
contracting Parties" because of "its particular importance owing to the
fact that it fills a gap in the legal system of Saudi Arabia with regard to
the oil industry., 7' The tribunal also emphasized the need to resort to the
67. U.N. Secretariat, Office of Legal Aff., Law Applicable to Contracts Concluded by
the United Nations with Private Parties-Procedures for Settling Disputes Arising out of such
Contracts-Relevant Rules and Practices, 1976 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 159, 160 [hereinafter UN
Legal Opinion].
68. Id. at 161. Likewise, article V, section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement between
ADB and the Republic of the Philippines provides, "The laws of the Republic of the Philip-
pines shall apply within the headquarters seat, and the courts of the Republic of the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction over acts done in the headquarters seat except as otherwise
provided in this Agreement (emphasis added)." Agreement Between the Asian Development
Bank and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of
the Asian Development Bank (Dec. 22, 1966), at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/
Charter/ADBPhilAgreement.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). Section 16 provides:
The headquarters seat shall be inviolable, and shall be under the control and author-
ity of the Bank, to the extent provided in this Agreement. The [Blank shall have the
power to make rules and regulations operative within the headquarters seat for the
full and independent exercise of its operations, administration and performance of
its functions.
The first sentence of section 16 must be read with section 15 as applicable to the headquarters
seat unless otherwise provided in the Headquarters Agreement. The second sentence of section
16 does not displace the jurisdiction of section 15; rather it is designed to accommodate
ADB's need for "the full and independent exercise of its operations, administration and per-
formance of its functions" by recognizing a rulemaking or regulatory competence within "the
headquarters seat." This recognition, however, only applies for matters ancillary to the ADB's
exercise of operations, administration, and performance of its functions.
69. U.N. Legal Opinion, supra note 67, at 161.
70. Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO, 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 1958).
71. Id. at 168.
[Vol. 27:177
Responsibility of International Organizations
general principles of law in case of doubts concerning the content or the
meaning of the agreement between the contracting parties.72
In dealing with non-contractual liability claims of private third par-
ties, the applicable law is local law and international law relating to the
organization's obligation. As a practical matter, therefore, all interna-
tional organizations are subject to the general reach of the local law of
their host state or of the state in which they carry out their activities, sub-
ject to the competence to make rules and regulations necessary for the
performance of their functions within their respective headquarters
seats 
7 3
2. The Limited Applicability of the Principles of State Responsibility
The notion of responsibility of international organizations encom-
passes the responsibility they incur for their wrongful acts under
international law.74 It accordingly corresponds in principle to the respon-
sibility of states for internationally wrongful acts. In this respect, the
principles of state responsibility are applicable mutatis mutandis to in-
ternational organizations, with necessary modifications due to the
inherent character of such organizations 75
There are, however, several fundamental differences in attributing
responsibility to international organizations. Apart from a situation in
which the United Nations is acting as an administering authority over a
territory and its inhabitants (e.g., in Cambodia in 1992 and East Timor in
1999),76 an international organization only has territorial jurisdiction over
a limited physical area recognized as the "headquarters seat" under its
72. Id.
73. A legal opinion issued by the Office of Legal Affairs summarizes the United Na-
tions' practice, stating in part:
In the case of commercial contracts, express reference has rarely been made to a
given system of municipal law. The standard practice is for the contract to contain
no choice of law clause as such; provision is made, however, for the settlement of
disputes by means of arbitration when agreement cannot be reached by direct nego-
tiations.
U.N. Legal Opinion, supra note 67, at 162.
74. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-fourth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 465 U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (2002).
75. J. de Ardchaga, International Responsibility, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 531, 595 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968); Clyde Eagleton, International
Organizations and the Law of Responsibility, in 76 RECUEIL DES COURs 323, 325 (1950);
MOSHE HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARDS THIRD
PARTIES: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES 11 (1995).
76. S.C. Res. 745, U.N. Doc. S/RES/745 (Feb. 28, 1992), whereby the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established; S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999), whereby the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor (UNTAET) was established.
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agreement with its host state. The responsibility of international
organizations, therefore, cannot be determined by the traditional
principle of territorial sovereignty, 77 as their activities are primarily
conducted either in the territory of the host state or in the territories of
other states under an agreement on the purpose, scope, and duration of
their operations." Member states, in whose territories international
organizations operate, usually participate in various decisionmaking
processes to plan a course of action and implement choices concerning
the allocation of funds, facilities, and personnel.
On the responsibility issue, all MDBs' grant-financing operations in-
clude a disclaimer provision in their respective agreements whereby the
organization disavows any liability.79 While it is theoretically possible for
private third parties to lodge claims against the host government within
domestic judicial processes, to do so is to substitute the responsibility of
an international organization for that of the host state. Professor Ian
Brownlie thus cautions: "There is no evidence of a presumption in law
that the United Nations bears either an exclusive or a primary responsi-
bility for the tortious acts of [its peacekeeping] forces, and the law
remains undeveloped. In practice the United Nations has accepted re-
sponsibility for the acts of its agents."8°
77. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); id. at 22: "[E]very
State's obligation [is] not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States"; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 118 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Advisory
Opinion] ("Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the
basis of State liability for acts affecting other States."); Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v.
Can.), 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941) ("[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.").
78. This does not apply when the United Nations acts as a transitional administering
authority, as in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor. See S.C. Res. 745, supra note 76; S.C.
Res. 1272, supra note 76.
79. The United Nations Development Programme's Basic Document for Provision of
Technical Assistance and ADB's Technical Assistance Framework Agreement invariably in-
clude an indemnity clause similar to the following:
The Government shall be responsible for dealing with any claims arising out of, or
resulting from, any Technical Assistance which may be brought by third parties
against the Bank or any Consultants. The Government shall indemnify the Bank
and the Consultants against any costs, claims, damages or liabilities arising out of,
or resulting from, any acts or omissions in connection with any Technical Assis-
tance, except where it is agreed by the Government and the Bank that such acts or
omissions amount to gross negligence or willful misconduct of such Consultants.
See also Arsanjani, supra note 9, 140 nn.26-27.
80. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 655 (6th ed. 2003).
The practice Professor Brownlie refers to concerns the wrongful acts of soldiers of the UN
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3. The Applicability of Customary International Law
That international organizations are not parties to most treaties pre-
sents a glaring contradiction to the professed principle of responsibility
of international organizations under international law. If they are not
bound by most treaties, what are the applicable laws regulating the con-
duct of international organizations? What remains is customary
international law, which creates obligations for international organiza-
tions in addition to those they voluntarily assume under international
treaty law. International organizations are, as stated by the ICJ in the
WHO case, "bound by any obligations incumbent upon them" under cus-
tomary international law.'
The need remains to clarify the specific obligations incumbent upon
international organizations under customary international law, as "cus-
tomary international law continues to exist and to apply, separately from
international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an
identical content." 2 We begin with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which is declaratory of customary international law and thus
binding upon international organizations. 3 As such, activities which vio-
late human rights, even those authorized by the governing bodies of
organizations, might be brought within the confines of excis de pou-
voir.84 In its 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion,"5 the ICJ indicated the
range of possible development in the treatment of rights violations by
Force in the Congo. A Belgian claimed that his property had been burned and looted by the
UN Force, and in 1962 he lodged a claim against the United Nations for compensation. M. v.
Organisation des Nations Unies et l'ttat Beige, 45 INT'L L. REP. 446 (1972). The United
Nations initially disputed the facts of the claim, but, after intercession by the Belgian govern-
ment, the UN declared it was prepared to "accept financial liability where the damage is the
result of action taken by agents of the United Nations in violation of the laws of war and the
rules of international law." Id. The real reason for the paucity of international organization tort
law cases appears to be that claimants accept the terms of a final settlement agreed upon be-
fore resolution of the matter through arbitral or judicial processes. In this case, the claimant
refused to accept a settlement and brought an action against the United Nations and the Bel-
gian government. The Civil Tribunal of Brussels dismissed the plaintiff's claim by stating,
"one cannot see where the U.N. could be sued, nor how, nor on what legal basis.., so long as
it shelters behind its immunity from jurisdiction." Id. at 455.
81. WHO case, supra note 60, at 89-90, 37.
82. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 96, T 179 (June
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua case].
83. W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867 (1990).
84. See McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 18, at 334. See also HIRSCH, su-
pra note 75, at 88-95; Ebere Osieke, The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of
International Organizations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1983); Arsanjani, supra note 9, at 153-
57; Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations, in
CAMBRIDGE ESSAY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 88, 94-99
(1965).
85. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 77.
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international organizations. Notwithstanding its overt protestation that
"the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in re-
spect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned,
86
the ICJ went on to actually review the lawfulness of certain resolutions
by the General Assembly and the Security Council under international
law.
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Given the overriding goal of poverty reduction, to which MDBs such
as the World Bank and ADB are committed as international institutions,
article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be a
point of departure for analyzing responsibility:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of liveli-
hood in circumstances beyond his control .
Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly resolved that "the
right to development is an inalienable human right" and that "states have
the duty to take steps individually and collectively, to formulate interna-
tional development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization
of the right to development."89 Out of several provisions of the Declara-
86. Id. at [89.
87. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 18, at 335, 357. See Constitution of
the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, Advisory Opinion, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (June 8) [hereinafter the IMCO case]; Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20)(reviewing the lawfulness of acts of
constituent bodies of international organizations).
88. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, art. 25, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). See, e.g., John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21, 32-37 (B. Ramcharan ed., 1979) (discussing the Universal
Declaration's effect as custom). In his separate opinion in the Namibia Advisory Opinion,
Vice-President Ammoun elaborated as follows:
Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding qua international con-
vention within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1(a), of the Statute of the
Court, they can bind States on the basis of custom within the meaning of paragraph
1 (b) of the same Article, whether because they constituted a codification of custom-
ary law as was said in respect of Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, or because they have acquired the force of custom through a general prac-
tice accepted as law, in the words of Article 38, paragraph I(b), of the Statute.
Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 77, at 67, 76. See also Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24).
89. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, annex, 41 U.N.
GAOR, 97th plen. mtg., Supp No. 53 at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986). The UN Sec-
retary-General urged the International Financial Institutions to gradually "incorporate human
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tion relevant to MDBs, the following two articles in particular are high-
lighted:
Article 2(1): Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 28: Everyone is entitled to a social and international or-
der in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized.
Article 28 indicates, according to Christine Chinkin, "[t]he impreci-
sion that fails to specify upon whom the duty to ensure the entitlements
lies allows for flexibility and for an inclusive, progressive interpretation
that assumes obligations upon states and non-state actors (including in-
ternational governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and multinational corporations) in ensuring the prescribed social order."9
The implementation of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment of 1972,9' the Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment,92 and Agenda 2 19 are part of global efforts to further bolster the
right of sustainable development to which MDBs are committed.
Customary international law is by definition of "a soft, indeterminate
character,"94 and the concept of sustainable development" is perforce
fights criteria in [their] work at all stages, including in project and policy lending, preparation
of guidelines, as well as in project and policy appraisal, monitoring and assessment." The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Resolution 1994/37 on
The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 248, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1995/10 (July 4, 1995).
90. Christine Chinkin, The United Nations Decade for the Elimination of Poverty: What
Role for International Law?, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 553, 559 (2001). The ICJ concluded
that a state is bound by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the exercise of its juridication
outside its own territory. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 1111-12 (July 9), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
91. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF/48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/
?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503 (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
92. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.I (June 14, 1992), available at http://www.unep.org/
Documents/?DocumentlD=78&ArticleID=1 163 (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
93. Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vols. I-II), available at http://
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents /agenda21/english/agenda2ltoc.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2005).
94. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995), quoted in
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
95. See, e.g., GUnther Handl, Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Specific
Obligations, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (Winifred Lang
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subject to creative interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation of such a
concept, as observed by the Namibia Advisoty Opinion, "cannot remain
unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of
the Untied Nations and by way of customary law. 96 Thus, in the Gabik-
ovo-Nagymaros case,97 the ICJ focused on the process of decisionmaking
as the key legal element in reconciling "economic development with pro-
tection of the environment" in the concept of sustainable development.9"
The ICJ therefore required the parties, in the interest of sustainable de-
velopment, to "look afresh" at environmental consequences in order to
"maintain the quality of the water of the Danube and to protect nature"
in conformity with "the norms of international environmental law and
the principles of the law of international watercourses. '99
The ICJ maintained its formal statement that it must examine "the
practice and opinio juris of States"' ° and satisfy itself that "the existence
of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice."'0 ' That
ed., 1995); PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT
84-97 (2nd ed. 2002); Case Concerning the Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry) [hereinafter
Gabeikovo-Nagymaros case]. "If the fundamental tenet of the Rio Conference is to be taken
seriously, sustainable development as the overriding policy objective must be recognized as
achievable only in a social setting that allows for public participation, citizen access to infor-
mation, a significant measure of decentralization of power, and governmental accountability."
Giinther Handl, Controlling Implementation of and Compliance with International Environ-
mental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio, 5 COLORADO J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
305 (1994). See also GUnther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Chal-
lenge to International Law, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (1990).
96. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 77, at 31, 53 (emphasis added). See also 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-26 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
1996).
97. Gabeikovo-Nagymaros case, supra note 95.
98. Id. at 78, T 140. See also the Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Bound-
ary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, at 299, 111 (Oct. 12).
99. Id. at 78, 140-141. The determination of what constitutes the violation of norms
of customary international law by domestic courts is, however, rather restrictive, as indicated
in a series of decisions in tortious liability claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act of the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. that in order to allege a violation of customary
international law, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant's alleged conduct violated
'well-established, universally recognized norms of international law.'" Flores, 253 F. Supp. 2d
510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Previously, the same court in Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp. rejected
the Stockholm Principles as evidence of customary international law because they "do not set
forth any specific proscriptions, but rather refer only in a general sense to the responsibility of
nations." 775 F Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 as "a general sense of environmental
responsibility" and "abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards
and regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or
torts .... " Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 E3D 161 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Flores,
414 F3d at 206.
100. Nicaragua case, supra note 82, at 97, 183.
101. Id. at 98, 184.
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said, the ICJ elaborated, "opinio juris may, though with all due caution,
be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of
States towards certain General Assembly resolutions."''0 2 On this, the ICJ
further stated:
The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be
understood as merely that of a "reiteration or elucidation" of the
treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it
may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or
set of rules declared by the resolution [sic] by themselves."'
Accordingly, the ICJ concluded that the principle of non-use of
force, for example, embodied in these resolutions "may thus be regarded
as a principle of customary international law."' '
The Stockholm Principles, the Rio Declaration, and Agenda 21 should
therefore be understood in the context of the development of law, as indi-
cated in the Namibia Advisory Opinion,'°5 the Gabctkovo-Nagymaros
case, 106 and the WTO Appellate Body's decision in the Shrimp/Turtle
case.107 Focusing "on the components of sustainable development, rather
than on the concept itself' would be more conducive to developing the
law in accordance with the Rio Declaration.
0 8
102. Id. at 99-100, 1 188. See also Christine Chinkin, The Role of Non-Governmental
Organisations in Standard Setting, Monitoring and Implementation of Human Rights, in THE
CHANGING WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A TRIBUTE TO
THE LATE KENNETH R. SIMMONDS 45 (Joseph J. Norton, Mads Andenas & Mary Footer eds.,
1998); Isabelle R. Cunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of
Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1991).
103. Nicaragua case, supra note 82, at 100, 188. For antecedents in earlier ICJ cases,
see Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 77, at 31-32, 52-53; Western Sahara, Advisory
Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 30 (Oct. 16). See K. Wolfe, Some Persistent Controversies Regarding
Customary International Law, 24 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1993). Compare Theodor Meron,
The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 361-370 (1987) with
Thomas Frank, Some Observations on the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 116, 118-19 (1987).
104. Nicaragua case, supra note 82, at 100, 188.
105. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 77, at 31, 53.
106. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros case, supra note 95.
107. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle
Case], which interpreted "exhaustible natural resources" of art. XX(g) of the GATT 1994 to
include "living or non-living" natural resources consistent with "the objective of sustainable
development." Id. at IT 127-131. The Appellate Body invoked the principle of effectiveness in
treaty interpretation. Id. 131. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & JAMES C.
MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE 184 (2d ed. 1994).
108. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 95, at 96.
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B. Structural Limitations on a Private Third Party's
Overall Access to International Fora
Notwithstanding the increased scope of access to international fora
accorded to private individuals and entities under international law'09
through bilateral and international arrangements, °"0 the real gatekeeper of
this access is still the power of state. As Professor Michael Reisman
wrote, "arbitration is not a deus ex machina."" The institutions of inter-
national arbitration, whether commercial or otherwise, must be
constructed out of "components supplied by the international political
system."" 2 Even though individual instances of international arbitration
are contingent on the consent of the parties to a dispute, "the arbitral sys-
tem itself is created and sustained by state institutions."' '
3
It is obvious that the major inhibiting factor is political. "In general,"
observed Professor Ian Brownlie, "it is unlikely that governments will
allow claims by individual citizens against other States to go forward
without retaining a right of control and veto."' 4 Thus, the disposition of
private third parties' claims against an international organization over its
activities in the territory of a member state must necessarily be contin-
gent upon the support of state institutions."5
Although international law governs the tortious responsibility of in-
ternational organizations, judicial fora rarely entertain claims initiated by
an aggrieved individual. As ADB's Administrative Tribunal stated in
109. BROWNLIE, supra note 80, at 57-58; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 48-55 (1994). "There is no general rule that the
individual cannot be a 'subject of international law,'" but such classification cannot be helpful
because "this may seem to imply the existence of capacities which do not exist and does not
avoid the task of distinguishing between the individual and other types of subject." BROWNLIE,
supra note 80, at 65.
110. Such agreements include instruments establishing the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal in 1981 and the European Commission of Human Rights in 1953. See Olufemi Elias,
General International Law in the European Court of Justice: From Hypothesis to Reality?, 31
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 30-33 (2000); ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK,
ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-294
(1995).
111. W. Michael Reisman, International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 ARB. INT'L
231, 235 (2002). See First Report, supra note 4, at 603 ("[T]he ultimate decision to raise and
effectively implement accountability will always remain a political one...
112. Reisman, supra note I11.
113. Id.
114. Ian Brownlie, The Individual Before Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdic-
tion, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 701, 720 (1962).
115. See First Report, supra note 4, at 603 ("[T]he ultimate decision to raise and effec-
tively implement accountability will always remain a political one, both in the hand of an 10
[international organization], through a decision of its most representative organ, or by one of
its counterparts.").
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Cynthia Bares et al. v. Asian Development Bank,"6 "The Tribunal is not
authorized to assess the international responsibility, tortious or other-
wise, of an international organization on the plane of public international
law, especially at the instance not of another person of public interna-
tional standing, but rather upon the initiative of an aggrieved
individual."' 7
In short, private individuals and groups are still dependent on a pro-
tecting state for access to international arenas. The inherent contradiction
in the protection of nationals by states is that such protection does not
apply to the nationals of the state in which human rights deprivations are
taking place. A.H. Robertson makes the point starkly:
The real party in interest, if a violation occurs, is the individual
whose rights have been denied; and the violation will in all
probability have been the act of the authorities of his own gov-
ernment. Under the classic concept of international law the
individual has no locus standi, on the theory that his government
will champion his rights. But how can his government be his
champion, when it is ex hypothesi the offender? What is neces-
sary therefore is to give the individual a right of appeal to an
international organ, which is competent to call the offending
party to account.
' 8
The same inherent contradiction equally exists in the lodging of
claims against an international organization operating within the member
state of private claimants. In the case of the United Nations' Congo op-
erations in 1965, it was the Belgian government that negotiated the level
of compensation for its claimants even as it shared the obligation to
compensate them." 9 In the normal context of an MDB's operations, the
government is the owner of the project, and the government and the
MDB agree upon its financing and implementation. It is natural for the
government to protect its rights. Therefore, in its judgment in the Marv-
rommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court of
International Justice observed: "By taking up the case of one of its sub-
jects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international proceedings
on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights-its right to
116. Bares, Decision No. 5 (Mar. 31, 1995), reprinted in ASIAN DEv. BANK ADMIN.
TRIBUNAL REP. 53 (1997).
117. Id. at 17.
118. A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 72-73 (1972), quoted in
McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 18, at 193.
119. See M. v. Organisation des Nations Unies et '~tat Beige, supra note 80.
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ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rule of international
law." 
20
Nonetheless, that international organizations are responsible for their
own conduct under international law is clearly stated in the Advisory
Opinion on Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Spe-
cial Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights: 1
2
Finally, the Court wishes to point out that the question of immu-
nity from legal process is distinct from the issue of compensation
for any damages incurred as a result of acts performed by the
United Nations or by its agents acting in their official capacity.
The United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for
the damage arising from such acts. However, as is clear from Ar-
ticle VIII, Section 29, of the General Convention, any such
claims against the United Nations shall not be dealt with by na-
tional courts but shall be settled in accordance with the
appropriate modes of settlement that "[t]he United Nations shall
make provisions for" pursuant to Section 29.122
The identification of the applicable law notwithstanding, no recourse
to national courts will be available unless international organizations
waive their immunity or organize some form of dispute settlement
mechanism by agreement. Article VIII of the Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the United Nations referred to above "only says
that the UN should provide some procedure for dispute settlement, with
no reference to specific methods.' ' 3 In the case of the United Nations'
claims against governments of states alleged to have caused injuries to
its staff during its operations, the great majority of these claims were not
settled and the states did not agree to arbitration.' 24 And, on its part, the
UN legislated to limit its tort liability concerning its headquarters dis-
trict, 1 5 where it is obliged to indemnify the victim in:
any tort action or in respect of any tort claim by any person
against the United Nations or against any person, including a cor-
poration, acting on behalf of the United Nations, to the extent that
the United Nations may be required to indemnify such person,
120. Marvrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No.
2, at 12 quoted in Nottenbohm (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 24 (Apr. 6).
121. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 88-89, 1 66 (Apr. 29).
122. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
123. Arsanjani, supra note 9, at 142.
124. Id.
125. Paul Szarz, The United Nations Legislates to Limit Its Liability, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
739 (1987).
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whether such person is a member of its staff, an expert or a con-
tractor, arising out of any act or omission, whether accidental or
otherwise, in the Headquarters district.
26
The need for the United Nations to limit its liability bolsters the ra-
tionale for the immunity it enjoys. An observer with rich inside
knowledge thus explains, "the Organization must be able to carry out its
functions without being inhibited by the vagaries of the liability juris-
prudence of the host state."'
' 27
Notwithstanding that these institutional limitations are embedded in
the legal regime for the determination of responsibility of international
organizations, MDBs have now at least opened windows of access,
through their accountability mechanisms, to private individuals seeking
to file complaints directly.
IV. THE MDB ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
A. The Rationale and Objectives of the Mechanisms
Although there is no perfect fit for an accountability mechanism for
any MDB, the governing principles behind such mechanisms are broadly
similar: (i) to promote transparency and accountability in the MDB's
operations; (ii) to complement the policy of allowing greater access to
information as well as beneficiary participation in designing and imple-
menting projects; (iii) to provide an independent investigation of the
claims of project-affected people; and (iv) to increase the credibility of
the institution.1
28
There is considerable uniformity among different accountability
mechanisms established in the MDBs with respect to who can exercise
access to the mechanism; how the mechanism is structured; the scope of
authority and control; the outcome of process under the mechanism; and
so on. To examine how private individuals and groups can effectively
seek redress from the MDB concerned is to examine the extent to which
the objective of establishing the accountability mechanism is achieved.
129
126. G.A. Res. 41/210, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/210 (Dec. 11, 1986).
127. Szarz, supra note 125, at 743.
128. See, e.g., New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 58.
129. For a more extensive exposition of a policy-oriented jurisprudence, see generally
HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUD-
IES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992). See also W. Michael Reisman, The View from the
New Haven School of International Law, 86 ASIL PROC. 118 (1992); Eisuke Suzuki, The New
Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 YALE
STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1974).
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B. Clarification of Policy for the Establishment
of an Accountability Mechanism
Since an accountability mechanism is an instrument to rein in the
power of an international organization, any suggestion to establish such
a mechanism generates many competing interests and conflicting claims
of various stakeholders inside and outside an MDB. To be viable and
effective, a mechanism should satisfy substantive and procedural princi-
ples to build a broader consensus among all stakeholders.
30
We suggest the following substantive principles:
(a) The Principle of Accountability: An MDB is accountable, first
and foremost, to all its shareholders (i.e., all member coun-
tries, whether developed or developing), and each member is
in turn accountable to its taxpayers for the efficient utilization
of resources mobilized from them. An MDB is also account-
able to its developing member country (DMC) governments,
to which technical assistance grants, loans, and other invest-
ment activities are made, and for the projects it finances or
administers. DMC governments are in turn accountable to
their respective citizens for the purpose and utilization of
these funds. Last but not least, as development partners, both
MDBs and DMC governments are accountable to the local
communities in which their projects are carried out.
(b) The Principle of Redress: If an MDB-assisted project (i.e., the
MDB funds or administers the project) harms its ultimate
beneficiaries, it is the responsibility of the owner of the pro-
ject (i.e., the DMC government), to provide appropriate
measures of redress where warranted. If harm is created
within the institution's purview, the institution should be in a
position to redress it.' If it is within the purview of the DMC
130. Cf. BRADLOW, supra note 16, at 50 ("This review, which included consultations
with interested parties in 10 different cities around the world, was a consequence of the politi-
cal and public relations problems that [the Asian Development Bank] experienced in the
Samut Prakarn case.").
131. The obligation to make full reparation is the general principle behind the conse-
quences of an internationally wrongful act, and "the essential forms of reparation in customary
law" were laid down by the PCIJ in the Factory at Chorz6w case, as quoted by the ICJ in the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a principle
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the deci-
sions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all prob-
ability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this
is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in
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government, the institution should seek the participation and
assistance of the government to help redress the harm.
(c) The Principle of Development Effectiveness: There are two
aspects of effectiveness: one is organizational effectiveness
and the other is operational effectiveness. (The former is in-
cluded in the principle of realism as part of procedural
principles below.) The lessons learned from establishing ac-
countability on matters of noncompliance and redress in the
course of project preparation, processing, or implementation
must feed back to enhance development effectiveness through
increased project quality and staff competence.
These three substantive principles establish the contours of common
interest for all stakeholders, inside and outside the institution. The fol-
lowing procedural principles are suggested in order to build a broad
consensus on the basis of the three substantive principles mentioned
above:
(a) The Principle of Transparency: An MDB cannot establish ac-
countability unless it discloses pertinent information about the
project for which project-affected people demand account-
ability.
(b) The Principle of Due Process: Those who are allegedly af-
fected by an MDB-assisted project should be given an
appropriate forum in which their grievances can be heard.
Likewise, the institution should be given an equal opportunity
to respond to such grievances. Due process also demands that
the affected party not be excluded from the decision proc-
132
ess.
(c) The Principle of Economy and Efficiency: Any mechanism
should be organized and managed efficiently. Each MDB is
under an obligation to exercise its fiduciary duty in the
kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would
not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it-such are the princi-
ples which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act
contrary to international law.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra
note 90, 152 (quoting Factory at Chorz6w, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 17, at 47).
132. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 88, provides
that every person is entitled to a hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the de-
termination of his rights and obligations.
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administration of funds, for which each member state has re-
posed its trust and confidence in the MDB.
(d) The Principle of Realism: This principle draws on political
feasibility and administrative practicability to protect the or-
ganizational effectiveness and powers of an MDB consistent
with the principle of specialty.'33 Any mechanism must be
both politically feasible and administratively practical in the
context of the existing legal regime under which the institu-
tion operates as an international organization.
C. Past Trends in Decisions Relating to Major
Features of the Mechanisms
Thus far, MDBs have more or less patterned their accountability
mechanisms after the basic procedural requirements established by the
World Bank Inspection Panel. The absence of access to effective reme-
dies stemming from an MDB's immunity from local jurisdiction is the
essential reason for the establishment of the accountability mechanism
as an internal mechanism, independent of local jurisdictions in which
MDBs remain immune.
Viewed from the MDB's perspective, the objective of the account-
ability mechanism is therefore two-fold: to allow private individuals
access to the MDB's internal decision process to air their complaints and
to safeguard against the possibility of the MDB being held liable by any
third party for material injuries allegedly sustained by private individu-
als. Accordingly, each MDB's policy carefully circumscribes the nature
and purpose of its accountability mechanism to the undertaking of inde-
pendent, but institutionally internal, administrative reviews. These
reviews are not to be equated with the conduct of judicial proceedings.
For example, unlike an administrative tribunal, no MDB accountability
mechanism is empowered to settle disputes between contractual parties.
Also, no MDB accountability mechanism can provide judicial-type
remedies such as injunctions or damages for noncompliance with its
policies and procedures.I 3
133. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, supra note
59, at 78, 25.
134. The 1995 Inspection Function "is not intended to provide judicial-type remedies
such as injunctions or money damages." 1995 Inspection Function, supra note 52, 23. Also,
the role of "the panels of outside experts convened to inspect particular Bank projects will be
advisory, not adjudicative, in nature." Id. 23. The New ADB Accountability Mechanism also
provides that "[s]ince the compliance review is not intended to provide judicial-type remedies,
such as injunctions or money damages, [the Compliance Review Panel's] findings and rec-
ommendations are not adjudicative." New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note i 6,
61.
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Given these institutional constraints, how have past decisions relat-
ing to the structure and procedures of MDB accountability mechanisms
fared in meeting the substantive and procedural goals of accountability?
1. Independence of the Compliance Review Panel
Some external stakeholders, primarily members of civil society, are
of the view that the World Bank Inspection Panel is not sufficiently in-
dependent3 5 because of the earlier Management practice of preparing
remedial "action plans." As a former World Bank Inspection Panel mem-
ber has stated:
In presenting its remedial action plans to the Panel and the
Board just prior to the meeting, or at the same meeting at which
the Board addresses the Panel's recommendation, Management
has made it impossible for the Panel (or the Board) to determine
whether the plans do, in fact, address the concerns of the Re-
questers and the findings of the Panel.
3 6
The offering of "remedial plans" by the World Bank Management
was a unique feature in the World Bank Inspection Panel system, as was
the failure of the World Bank Board to restrain Management from com-
menting on eligibility in at least five claims.3 7 In 1997, a former World
Bank Inspection Panel member acknowledged:
[T]he World Bank Inspection Panel has been unable to fulfill
some of the central hopes of those who initiated it. The inde-
pendence of the Panel is only partial at best, with the Board
often divided in supporting the statutory independence of the
Panel from Management. It is indicative that the Board has not
restrained Management from commenting on eligibility (a matter
reserved to the Panel, with confirmation by the Board, in the
Resolution) and has not prevented recurrent and last-minute intro-
duction of 'action plans' that interfere with the Panel's work.
The Board and Management, in their own ways and from
135. Dana L. Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Account-
ability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 206, 217 (2002) (using the term "quasi-independent").
Similarly, Richard E. Bissell has indicated that the independence of the World Bank Inspec-
tion Panel is "only partial at best, with the Board often divided in supporting the statutory
independence of the Panel from Management." Richard E. Bissell, Institutional and Proce-
dural Aspects of the Inspection Panel, in THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK: A
DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 107, 124 (G. Alfredsson and R. Ring eds., 2001) [here-
inafter THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK].
136. Alvaro Umana, Some Lessons from the Inspection Panel's Experience, in THE IN-
SPECTION PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK, supra note 135, at 127, 133-34.
137. UDALL, supra note 33, at 73.
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different perspectives, are uncomfortable with the Panel being
independent.3
Under the 1995 Inspection Function, a panel of experts was a func-
tionary of the Board Inspection Committee (BIC), a committee of the
Board of Directors, and did not have its own reporting relationship with
the Board; rather, the panel of experts reported to the BIC, which in turn
submitted to the Board its own report on the basis of the panel's findings
and recommendations. As a result, the relationship between the panel
and the BIC on the one hand and the BIC and the Board on the other not
only reduced the independence of the panel, but it also strained the
panel's relationship with Management. Moreover, the ad hoc selection of
the panel from a roster of experts on a case-to-case basis did not allow
for the accumulation of expertise and institutional knowledge, nor did it
contribute to the continuity and stability of the panel. In the end, the
panel's lack of independence threatened the credibility and viability of
the inspection process itself.
Under the new ADB Accountability Mechanism, ADB Compliance
Review Panel members are appointed by the Board and report to the
Board on all activities except those they report to the Board Compliance
Review Committee (BCRC), which is restructured from the BIC. 3 9 The
retention of a Board committee in the form of the BCRC ensures that the
panel is not given unfettered discretion in carrying out its work. 4 In-
stead, a system of "checks and balances" guarantees the panel operates
within the mandate provided by the Board.
2. Who Can File a Request for Compliance Review?
The World Bank Inspection Panel prescribed that eligible requesters
must be "an affected party in the territory of the borrower which is not a
single individual (i.e., a community of persons such as an organization,
association, society or other grouping of individuals)." 4 Four other
MDBs-IDB, ADB, EBRD, and AfDB--essentially followed the same
rationale by requiring a group of at least two individuals who share a
138. Bissell, supra note 135, at 124-25.
139. The specific activities where the BCRC exercises oversight functions over the
Compliance Review Panel are (i) clearing the panel's terms of reference and (ii) reviewing the
panel's draft monitoring reports following its monitoring of the implementation of Board-
approved decisions resulting from a compliance review.
140. Bissell, a former World Bank Inspection Panel member, notes that "[t]he Board and
Management, in their own ways and from different perspectives, are uncomfortable with the
Panel being independent." Bissell, supra note 135, at 125. This is equally true of the experi-
ence at IDB with its Independent Investigation Mechanism, and at ADB with its 1995
Inspection Function.
141. World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 12.
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commonality of interests to act together in filing a complaint. Other de-
velopment-related institutions have followed this majority approach,
including the Japan Bank for International Corporation (JBIC) in 2003
and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in 2004. 42
ADB's 1995 Inspection Function, however, not only allowed af-
fected parties residing "in the borrowing member country in which the
relevant Bank project is being or will be implemented" to file a request,
but extended the right to those "in a member country adjacent to such
borrowing member country."' 43 ADB is the only MDB that allows af-
fected people in a neighboring country to file a complaint in conformity
with international decisions such as the Trail Smelter Arbitration'" and
the Lake Lanoux Arbitration.'45 The new ADB Accountability Mecha-
nism of 2003 has maintained the same eligibility requirement.i
3. The Basis of Complaint
a. The MDB's Noncompliance
The requirements for a complaint before an MDB on its operational
activities stem from the World Bank Inspection Panel's accountability
mechanism, which prescribes that the affected party:
must demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are
likely to be directly affected by an action or omission of the
Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its operational
policies and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal
142. See IDB IIM Rules and Procedures, supra note 49, 3.2; New ADB Accountability
Mechanism, supra note 16, $ 68, 103; EBRD IRM Rules of Procedure supra note 54, 1(a);
AfDB IRM Operating Rules and Procedures, supra note 55, 4(a); JBIC's Summary of Proce-
dures to Submit Objections Concerning JBIC Guidelines for Confirmation of Environmental
and Social Considerations, section IV.2 (Oct. 2003), at http://www.jbic.go.jp/englishl
environ/pdf/objection.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter JBIC Summary of Proce-
dures]; OPIC's General Policy and Guidelines on its Accountability and Advisory Mechanism
(AAM), approved by OPIC's Board of Directors in September 2004, 1, which states that the
AAM's objective is "addressing the concerns of locally affected communities regarding spe-
cific OPIC projects," and 4(b), which states that "impacted communities in the host country"
can request compliance review and problem-solving. In the case of IFC and MIGA's CAO,
"[a]ny individual, group, community, entity, or other party affected or likely to be affected by
the social and/or environmental impacts of an IFC or MIGA project may make a complaint to
the CAO." See also Revised Operational Guidelines for CAO, at 10 (Apr. 2004), at
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/CAO%20 Operational%2OGuidelines%20english% 203-31-
FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
143. 1995 Inspection Function, supra note 52, 28.
144. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 77.
145. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 INT'L L. REP. 101 (Arb. Trib. 1957).
146. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, % 68, 103. IFC and MIGA's
CAO is the only mechanism that allows a single individual to file a complaint, but this right
does not cover the filing of a compliance audit.
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and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank (in-
cluding situations where the Bank is alleged to have failed in its
follow-up on the borrower's obligations under loan agreements
with respect to such policies and procedures) provided in all
cases that such failure has had, or threatens to have, a material
adverse effect.1
47
The basis for review is limited only to a failure of the MDB to follow
its operational policies and procedures. This limitation formally reso-
nates with the principle of noninterference with the domestic affairs of
other states.
4 8
The inspection panel or accountability mechanism of any of the
MDBs does not have competence to investigate the borrower's account-
ability, i.e., how the borrower discharges its responsibility, how it
conducts the process of implementation, and how it manages project per-
formance as the "owner" of the project. This is so even though the MDB
and the borrower share concurrent responsibility for project performance
management (in terms of the MDB's responsibility for its portfolio man-
agement as the lender and the borrower's responsibility for its project
management as the owner of the project). Since the mechanism's compe-
tence extends to investigating the MDB's failure to follow up on the
borrower's obligations under the loan agreement, the scope of what con-
stitutes such failure is an essentially relative question; it depends on the
development of relations between the MDB and the borrower concerned,
and it may not stop short of addressing the accountability of the bor-
149rower.
147. World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 12.
148. But see Nico Schrijver, The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty, in 70 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 65 (2000); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United
Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968). See also
Reisman, supra note 83, at 872 ("By shifting the fulcrum of the system from the protection of
sovereigns to the protection of people, it works qualitative changes in virtually every compo-
nent.").
149. See Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7) ("The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of
international relations."). Consider in this connection the development of MDBs' competence
to examine and take into account "governance issues" in spite of the formal prohibition on
interference "in the political affairs of any member" and the formal requirement of only "eco-
nomic considerations." See also SHIHATA, supra note 43, 245-82. Prohibition of political
activity is prescribed in art. 36, 2 of the ADB Charter; art. 38, T 2 of the AfDB Charter; art.
VIII, sec. 5(f) of the IDB Charter; and art. IV, sec. 10 of the IBRD Charter. The argument
against political considerations "now has much less force, not least because of those institu-
tions' own commitments to good governance, sustainable development, and poverty
reduction." Chinkin, supra note 90, at 571. See also Handl, supra note 14, at 643.
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b. The Allegation of Material Adverse Effect
The affected party's complaint must allege "a material adverse ef-
fect" in its request for inspection.' 50 As the presence of "a material
adverse effect" must be the result of the MDB's noncompliance with its
policies and procedures, it is the panel's duty to dispose of the question
of compliance first. To do otherwise would "open the door wide to
claims against the Bank even when no violation of a legal obligation was
ever attributed to the Bank or established by a court of law."'5 ' In this
respect, it is worth quoting the relevant conclusions of the World Bank
Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel:
52
13. As required by the Resolution, the Panel's report to the
Board will focus on whether there is a serious Bank failure to
observe its operational policies and procedures with respect to
project design, appraisal and/or implementation. ... The Panel
will discuss in its written report only those material adverse ef-
fects, alleged in the request, that have totally or partially resulted
from serious Bank failure of compliance with its policies and
procedures ....
14. For assessing material adverse effect, the without-project
situation should be used as the base case for comparison, taking
into account what baseline information may be available. Non-
accomplishments and unfulfilled expectations that do not gener-
ate a material deterioration compared to the without-project
situation will not be considered as a material adverse effect for
'53
this purpose ....
The requirement of "material adverse effect" is a fundamental depar-
ture from the law of state responsibility.'-
150. World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 12.
151. SHIHATA, supra note 16, at 213.
152. The World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, has gone through two
reviews by the World Bank's Board of Directors. These reviews resulted in the Board's
"Clarifications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution" on Oct. 17, 1996, available at http://
wblnOO18.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf[Wrelease/ABD7787B03330B66852568 D9004CC72E
(last visited Aug. 5, 2005) and in the Board's Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of
the Inspection Panel (Apr. 20, 1999), at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.orgPN/ipnweb.nsf/
Wrelease/9203E5F9E8E33EA5852568D9004B25B6 (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). See Clarifi-
cations of Certain Aspects of the Resolution (1996) and Conclusions of the Board's Second
Review of the Inspection Panel (1999) reprinted in World Bank, World Bank Operational
Manual: Bank Procedures 17.55, annex B (February 1997) and annex C (August 1999) and in
SHIHATA, supra note 16, at 320, 323.
153. Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel, supra note 152,
IT 13, 14.
154. In the Rainbow Warrior case, despite its initial argument that "damage is necessary
to provide a basis for liability to make reparation" France recognized "in principle that there
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References in the MDBs' accountability mechanisms to "a material
adverse effect" are also expressed in terms of "harm," "damage," and
"injury," as in the Articles on Responsibility of States.'5 5 Since an inter-
nationally wrongful act is a breach of an international obligation, an
MDB's responsibility arising from its failure to follow its policies and
procedures will hinge on the extent to which such policies and proce-
dures are considered part of obligations under international law.
An MDB's operational policies and procedures serve the purpose of
internal administration with a view to increasing the efficiency, effec-
tiveness, and accountability of operations in member countries. As such,
they cannot be considered part of international law unless an MDB has
voluntarily assumed such obligations within international agreements.'56
can be legal or moral damage and that material loss is not the only form of damage in this
case." Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and France concerning the inter-
pretation of two agreements concluded on 9 July 1986 between the two States and which
related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affairs, XX R.I.A.A. 217, 266,
107, 267, 109 (Decision of Apr. 30, 1990). Both parties agreed that "the concept of dam-
age does not possess an exclusive material or patrimonial character." Id. at 267, 109.
Accordingly, they agreed that "[u]nlawful action against non-material interests, such as acts
affecting the honor, dignity or prestige of a State, entitle the victim State to receive adequate
reparation, even if those acts have not resulted in a pecuniary or material loss for the claimant
State." Id. This suggests that "acts affecting the honor, dignity or prestige" of private individu-
als and groups are excluded from the MDB's compliance review. Consider the ILA
Committee's Third Report, supra note 4, at 785 ("Responsibility of 10s [international organi-
zations] may arise from non-compliance with any of the applicable bodies of law, while their
liability will be implicated when (significant) harm has been caused by any of the activities
carried out by them.") (emphasis added). See Commentary (6) and (7) to article 31 of the Arti-
cles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
CoMMIssioN's ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 203.
155. Article 31, 1 stipulates, "The responsible State is under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act." Article 31, 2 provides,
"Injury includes damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful
act of a State."
156. The UN Secretary-General unilaterally promulgated "fundamental principles and
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces conducting opera-
tions under United Nations command and control." UN Secretary-General, Secretary
General's Bulletin, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1656
(1999). In Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) and Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), the ICJ opined, "It is
well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations.... When it is the intention of the
State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention
confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking ...." Nuclear Tests (Austl. v.
Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, at 267, 43 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, at
472, T46 (Dec. 20). See BROWNLIE, supra note 80, at 613 ("A state may evidence a clear
intention to accept obligations vis-a-vis certain other states by a public declaration which is
not an offer or otherwise dependent on reciprocal undertakings from the states concerned.").
Despite the caution expressed by the Court in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.;
ER.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 20), that unilateral assumption of the obligations of a
convention by conduct was "not lightly to be presumed" and that "a very consistent course of
conduct" was required in such a situation. The Court applied the principle recognized in the
Nuclear Tests cases in the Nicaragua case, supra note 82, at 132, 261, and in the Case Concern-
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Apart from customary international law, MDBs are rarely bound by
international treaty law, as they are not normally parties to international
treaties; such treaties are res inter alios acta and not binding on MDBs
without their consent.'57 There are, however, new areas where MDBs
have made a voluntary commitment to support and conform to various
international obligations assumed by states.'
c. The Nexus Between "Material Damage" and an MDB's Failure to
Comply with its Policies and Procedures
As mentioned above, an MDB's accountability mechanism requires
the establishment of a causal link between material damage and the
ing the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, at 573-74, E 39-40 (Dec. 22).
See also BROWNLIE, supra note 80, at 613-14.
157. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or Between International Organizations, art. 38, May 22, 1969
("Nothing ... precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State
or a third organization as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such*"). For a
fair description of how provisions of a treaty become part of international customary law, see
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 156, at 41-43. International treaties are nor-
mally not open for accession or ratification by international organizations other than "regional
economic integration organizations," and none of the MDBs are considered regional economic
integration organizations. A modus operandi of accession is, however, not uniform, as shown
in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004). The Convention
Against Corruption stipulates that it is also open for signature by "regional economic integra-
tion organizations provided at least one member State of such organization has signed this
Convention" Id. at 71, 1 2. But it allows such organizations to deposit their instruments of
ratification, acceptance, or approval if at least one of its member states has done likewise. Id.
at 72, 3. Art. 34 of the Convention on Biological Diversity allows any regional economic
integration organization to become a party to the Convention without any of its member states
being a Contracting Party and to be bound by all the obligations under the Convention or the
protocol, as the case may be.
158. EBRD has stated in its Public Information Policy that it will "take into account the
Aarhus Convention, the general spirit, purpose and ultimate goals of which are subscribed to
by the Bank in the implementation of its Environmental Policy, along with other relevant in-
ternational conventions." EBRD, Public Information Policy at 3 (July 2003), at http://
www.ebrd.com/about/policies/pip/pip.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). In its Environmental
Policy, EBRD also stated:
[It will support] through investments the implementation of Agenda 21 and of rele-
vant global and regional agreements on environment and sustainable development,
including the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, the
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention on Environmental Impact As-
sessment in a Transboundary Context, and the Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters.
EBRD, Environmental Policy at 13 (July 2003), at http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/
enviro/policy/policy.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). For a fuller exposition of normative effects
that may flow from the relationship between international organizations, particularly MDBs,
the nature, goal, and objectives of multilateral treaties, and the process by which these instru-
ments have been adopted and the support they enjoy, see Handl, supra note 14, at 658-64.
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MDB's noncompliance with its policies and procedures. The Second
Review of the World Bank Inspection Panel reconfirmed the essentiality
of this requirement. The Executive Directors had hitherto downplayed
the panel's role "in checking compliance with operational policies"
while emphasizing "its role in addressing actual or potential harm to lo-
cal populations and assessing remedial actions."'59 The Second Review
concluded that the panel would discuss "only those material adverse
effects, alleged in the request, that have totally or partially resulted from
serious Bank failure of compliance with its policies and procedures."'
6
The effect of this requirement is to relieve the MDB from potential li-
ability for damage arising from activities that are otherwise lawful or
involve no wrongful acts.
4. The Prior Exhaustion of Recourse to Management
The panel can entertain a request for inspection only after it satisfies
itself that "the subject matter of the request has been dealt with by the
Management of the Bank and Management has failed to demonstrate
that it has followed, or is taking adequate steps to follow the Bank's
policies and procedures."'' 6' This is equivalent, in a way, to the require-
ment of an exhaustion of local remedies before an individual is allowed
to seek international remedies. The requirement is part of the responsi-
bility of Management to respond to initial complaints, and it may be
referred to as the principle of complementarity. It squarely places the
burden on Management to dispose of the complaints of private third par-
ties. The principle of complementarity triggers the problem-solving
function, or consultation phase, referred to below, 62 only when opera-
tions departments are unable or unwilling to address the complaint.
5. The Panel's Right to Visit the Project Site
MDBs' accountability mechanisms hold the right to visit a project
site. Unfortunately, this right attracted significant attention in connection
with ADB's Samut Prakarn inspection case. 63 This was ADB's first full-
blown case, and its Inspection Panel was not able to visit the project site.
ADB was criticized even though MDB accountability mechanisms at
159. Some Lessons from the Inspection Panel's Three Years Experience, INSP/SecM97-
11 (Nov. 6, 1997), quoted in SHIHATA, supra note 16, at 175.
160. Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel, supra note 152,
13 (emphasis added).
161. World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 13.
162. See infra Part V.
163. This issue was extensively discussed during the ADB Inspection Function review
process. See External Comments Received on the Review from March to September 2002 (May
12, 2003), at http://www.adb.org/Inspection/review.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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AfDB, EBRD, IDB, and the World Bank contain similar restrictive pro-
visions. '6'
In fact, in the World Bank's initial inspection cases, the Executive
Directors frequently rejected the panel's recommendations for inspec-
tion. The World Bank also requires the "prior consent" of the DMC
government concerned before the panel visits the project site. 65 The
clarification given during the World Bank's Second Review in 1999
merely states that the Board "assumes the borrowers' consent for field
visits envisaged in the Resolution."' 66 There has been only one case in
which the panel's site visit was not conducted because of worries ex-
pressed by the member government concerned. 167 While external
stakeholders, mostly NGOs and civil society groups, demand the re-
moval of the "no objection" requirement from the panel's right to a site
visit,'6 ' some DMCs are concerned that the inspection process creates a
misperception that the government has done something wrong and is
being inspected. Some argue that unconditionally requiring site visits
infringes on the DMC's sovereignty and that DMCs have every right to
turn down a visit. The revised 2003 policy reconfirms the same approach
of "no objection" and the requirement of prior consent of the DMC gov-
ernment. Rather than imposing a compulsory site visit obligation
through loan agreements, the policy assumes DMCs will routinely give
consent as part of the good faith cooperation of all parties in the compli-
ance review process.169
6. The Authority of the Inspection Panel to Make a Recommendation
and the Scope of Such Recommendation
The World Bank's Inspection Panel does not make any recommenda-
tions about remedial measures to the Board; it only passes judgment on
the World Bank's noncompliance. Instead, it is the World Bank's Man-
agement that makes recommendations to the Board for remedial
measures on the basis of the panel's report and findings.
70
In the earlier cases of the World Bank, Management submitted re-
medial action plans to the Board in response to a claimant's request for
164. ADB's 1995 policy stipulates, "Any part of the inspection to be conducted by the
Panel or its consultants in the territory of a borrowing country will be carried out only if the
country has no objection." 1995 Inspection Function, supra note 52, 41.
165. World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 21.
166. Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel, supra note 152,
19.
167. WORLD BANK, ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL 10
YEARS ON 245 (2003). See also SHIHATA, supra note 16, at 131; UDALL, supra note 33, at 44.
168. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 55.
169. Id. 156.
170. World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, at 23.
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inspection before the panel investigated the claims; the plans related to
corrective measures to be taken by the borrower rather than the World
Bank.17 Since they focused on "the borrower's failure and the measures
to be taken by the borrower to correct them," the plans distorted the
process itself.' In contrast, under the ADB's 1995 policy, both the panel
of experts and the BIC were authorized to make a finding on the compli-
ance of ADB's operational policies and procedures and submit a
recommendation about remedial measures regarding the inspected pro-
ject to the Board.
7
1
Similarly, the new ADB Accountability Mechanism authorizes the
Compliance Review Panel to make "recommendations to ensure project
compliance, including recommendations, if appropriate, for any remedial
changes in the scope or implementation of the project."'74 This is in ac-
cord with the Chorz6w principle that jurisdiction over the breach of an
obligation extends to any remedy sought in respect of the breach:
"Where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no sepa-
rate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court to consider the
remedies a party has requested for the breach of the obligation."'
' 75
7. A 95 Percent Disbursement Limit
The World Bank Inspection Panel,'76 the IDB Independent Investiga-
tion Mechanism,' 7  and the 1995 ADB Inspection Function will not
accept a request for inspection for completed projects or projects where
at least 95 percent of the loan financing has been disbursed-this is
known as the 95 percent disbursement limit.78 This limit generated ex-
tensive discussions during ADB's inspection function review process,
particularly because the question of accountability is independent of the
status of project administration or the quantum of loan proceeds dis-
bursed. Furthermore, the cut-off limit linked to the disbursement is
arbitrary and susceptible to manipulation, as a 95 percent disbursement
171. SHIHATA, supra note 16, at 222-23.
172. In the Second Review of the Inspection Panel by the World Bank's Board, the
Board prohibited Management from communicating with "the Board on matters associated
with the request for inspection, except as provided for in the Resolution." The Board in-
structed Management to "direct its response to the request, including any steps it intends to
take to address its failures, if any, to the Panel." Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of
the Inspection Panel, supra note 152, 2.
173. 1995 Inspection Function, supra note 52, V 43-44.
174. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 126.
175. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Merits, 40 I.L.M. 1069, 1082,$ 48 (Judgment of June 27,
2001) (citing Factory at Chorz6w, 1927, P.C.I.J., (ser. A), No. 9, at 22).
176. World Bank Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 14(c).
177. IDB IIM Rules and Procedures, supra note 49, 1.5(d).
178. 1995 Inspection Function, supra note 52, 3 1(c).
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is subject to the cancellation of a portion of the undisbursed loan
amount.
The new ADB Accountability Mechanism replaces the 95 percent
disbursement limit as a cut-off with the date of the issuance of a project
completion report (PCR) for the ADB-assisted project. The ADB issues
the PCR within 1-2 years after the project is physically completed and in
operation. 79 The EBRD Independent Recourse Mechanism also does not
adopt the 95 percent disbursement limit, instead placing the cut-off point
beyond the disbursement limit but before issuance of a PCR. EBRD has
adopted the cut-off of 12 months "after the date of the physical comple-
tion of the Project" or, where physical completion is not an appropriate
measure, 12 months after the date of the final disbursement or cancella-
tion of EBRD's operation. The AfDB Independent Review Mechanism
also prescribes a cut-off limit of complaints filed "12 months after
physical completion of the project concerned."'
80
It is noteworthy that JBIC has used a cut-off point far beyond that of
any MDB: a requester can file a claim of JBIC's noncompliance with its
Guidelines for Confirmation of Environmental and Social Considera-
tions up to completion of disbursement; after completion of
disbursement, a requester can also file a claim of JBIC's noncompliance
with its monitoring provisions during the period in which JBIC is moni-
toring the matter pursuant to its guidelines.'8 '
8. Claimants' Right to Rebuttal and Due Process
ADB's 1995 Inspection Function, like the World Bank's current In-
spection Panel, did not provide an opportunity for claimants to comment
on Management's answer or the panel's draft report. The absence of such
opportunity of rebuttal was one-sided, particularly in view of the World
Bank Management's submission of a remedial action plan as part of
Management's response, as discussed earlier.'82 A simple due process
requirement is clearly lacking at the World Bank and IDB. The new
ADB Accountability Mechanism provides for the claimant to be in-
formed at various stages of both the consultation process and the
179. In the case of private sector projects for which a PCR is not issued, the cut-off date
is two years after the project is physically completed and in operation; or, where physical
completion is waived or is not relevant (e.g., financial intermediation projects), one year after
the date of the final disbursement or termination of ADB's involvement in the project, which-
ever occurs earlier. ADB, OPERATIONS MANUAL, OM Section Ll/OP, at 4 n.1 (Oct. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/Operations/default.asp?p=aadb (last
visited Aug. 5, 2005).
180. EBRD IRM Rules of Procedure, supra note 54, 18; AJDB IRM Operating Rules
and Procedures, supra note 55, 2(viii).
181. JBIC Summary of Procedures, supra note 142, sec. IV.3.
182. See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
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compliance review process; most significantly, the claimant can com-
ment on the Compliance Review Panel's draft report after the panel has
carried out a compliance review.'83 The opportunity for the claimant (as
well as Management) to provide their responses to the Compliance Re-
view Panel's draft report is a significant milestone that has hitherto been
unavailable to the claimant in any MDB accountability mechanism.'
9. Sanctions Provisions in the Loan Agreement
Since the loan agreement is a contractual arrangement between the
MDB as the lender and the DMC as the borrower, it does not, in principle,
involve third parties. Remedies available under the loan agreement are
primarily for the protection of the interests of the lender. Affected indi-
viduals are outside the system of this contractual arrangement. Arguments
for the inclusion of some form of sanctions in the loan agreement, such as
suspension or cancellation of the loan when a compliance review is under
way, are misplaced; these remedies would penalize the borrower when the
object of compliance review is the lender. In fact, if the borrower fails to
perform obligations under the loan agreement, remedies are available to
the lender under the loan regulations.
A proper forum for the settlement of any disputes between the MDB
and its borrowers, arising in connection with the performance of the loan
agreement and not resolved by negotiations, is arbitration as provided for
in the applicable loan regulations. The MDB's noncompliance cannot
possibly be grounds for suspension or cancellation of the loan when the
borrower is not at fault. The 1995 policy, therefore, provided:
Any remedial changes in project scope or implementation (or, if
warranted, the suspension or cancellation of the project) will be
carried out in accordance with applicable Bank procedures
(which require the consent of the relevant borrower or grant
recipient, except as otherwise provided in the Bank's Loan
Regulations or other relevant legal documents).
85
The new ADB Accountability Mechanism adopted the same pol-
icy,"' as did EBRD's IRM.
87
183. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 125. See Dana Clark &
David Hunter, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Simplifying Citizen Voices for Sustainable
Development, in THE INSPECTION PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK, supra note 135, at 167,
188-89 (expanding the role of the claimants).
184. The EBRD's mechanism and AfDB's mechanism do not provide the claimant
with an opportunity to comment on the expert's findings and recommendation forwarded to
the President or Board, as applicable, for decision.
185. 1995 Inspection Function, supra note 52, 45.
186. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 1 128.
187. EBRD IRM Rules of Procedure, supra note 54, 22 of annex 1.
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V. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF
AN ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM
The World Bank Inspection Panel has evolved from a body that civil
groups criticized before the Second Review in 1999 to one that has
"given increased legitimacy to the claims of people affected by the
World Bank" and has served "as a forum through which their voices
have been amplified within the institution" and "a catalyst for broader
change at the World Bank.'"88 Even so, it is still under increasing pres-
sure from criticism that: (i) the institution should move towards
"effective problem solving and greater accountability;"'8 9 (ii) the panel
lacks powers of enforcement or restitution, oversight over the implemen-
tation of remedial measures, and the ability to assess whether
Management's proposed remedial measures satisfy the concerns of the
claimants and/or bring the project into compliance;'0 and (iii) the institu-
tion should create "a problem solving unit that is responsible for
remedying the social and environmental policy violations identified by
the Inspection Panel and helping to ensure that displaced and aggrieved
communities are adequately compensated and assisted to improve their
standards of living" and engages in "solving problems, promoting com-
pliance, and providing technical and financial assistance to borrowers
and [World] Bank staff to help accomplish .. social and environmental
policy objectives."' 9'
The net result of the inspection function is that the question of inter-
nal compliance or noncompliance has become the focus of the inspection
process, and the real question of accountability toward people who are
affected by MDBs' projects has become sidelined. Once the inspection
function accepts the complainants' request for inspection and authorizes
an inspection, the complainants themselves are left outside the system.
The affected people who requested "inspection" will eventually be in-
formed of the outcome of the inspection process only after the process is
completed, with the possibility that their problem will remain unre-
solved.
92
188. Kay Treakle, Jonathan Fox, & Dana Clark, Lessons Learned, in DEMANDING Ac-
COUNTABILITY: CIVIL SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 247 (Dana
Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle eds., 2003).
189. Id. at 275.
190. Dana L. Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Account-
ability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 218 (2002). See Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle, Concluding
Propositions, in DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 188, at 285.
191. Clark, supra note 190, at 224-25.
192. ADB made the following observation in April 2004:
Following loan closure, and after more than 1 year of investigations, the Project re-
mains incomplete and suspended. No further action or progress has occurred on the
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It is natural that complainants are more interested in having their
complaints addressed and properly resolved by the MDB concerned than
in the question of compliance or noncompliance. As a development fi-
nancial institution, each MDB is a principal interested party in the
success of a project. As such, no MDB can walk away from problems on
the ground under the pretext that a government owns the project, but one
must also recognize that not every problem can be resolved by an MDB
alone. No major problems can be resolved without the participation,
consent, and cooperation of the DMC government concerned. Yet, de-
spite the good faith efforts of both MDBs and DMC governments,
problems on the ground remain unresolved.
Thus, the issues are joined. The question of whether there should be
an independent problem-solving function on top of the internal problem-
solving functions performed by operations departments of the MDB is
the same as the question of whether there should be an independent in-
spection function when all operations departments ensure internal
compliance.
A. The Introduction of a Problem-Solving Function
While the World Bank Inspection Panel is focused on compliance re-
view, problemsolving is the cornerstone of IFC and MIGA's Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO). The CAO does not focus on compliance
review in terms of a compliance review claim from project-affected peo-
ple.' 93 The ADB Accountability Mechanism provides for both compliance
and problem-solving functions, each handled by a separate entity: the
compensation plan, monitoring activities, community involvement initiatives or
odor and effluent management. There is no clear indication of what the Govern-
ment's next steps will be with regard to the future of the Project and when they will
be taken.
Fourth Semiannual Report to the Board of Directors on the Implementation of the Recommen-
dations of the Board Inspection Committee as Adopted on 25 March 2002, 11, (Apr. 2004),
at http://www.adb.org/ inspection/samut-prakam-4thsemirep.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
With regard to the latest status of the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project, ADB
made the following conclusion and recommendation in June 2005: "In view of the static status
of the Project in all the key monitoring aspects, it is recommended that submission of semian-
nual reports be discontinued as of this report. The staff will continue to monitor the Project
and report the new development, if any." Sixth Semiannual Report to the Board of Directors on
the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Board Inspection Committee as Adopted
on 25 March 2002, 9, (June 2005), at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Samut-
Prakarn/R 51-05.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
193. The CAO had an external review in 2003. The External Review Team Report
on the CAO office of IFC and MIGA, (July 24, 2003), at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/
pdfs/CAO%20Evaluation%20Report%207-26-03.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). For analysis of
the difficulty in including the compliance audit function within the CAO's other functions
(advisory and ombudsman), see id. at 24-25.
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Special Project Facilitator handles the consultation (problem-solving)
phase and the Compliance Review Panel handles the compliance review
phase. ADB uses "consultation" rather than "problem-solving" to avoid
the impression that it can solve all problems, and the term conveys a
more informal and multimethod approach. The consultation phase con-
sists of the Special Project Facilitator (the SPF), who will respond to
specific problems of locally affected people in ADB-assisted projects
through a range of informal and flexible methods.
94
The question faced by ADB is how it can best facilitate the resolu-
tion of problems on the ground, recognizing that the complaints are
primarily between the project owner, the DMC government, and the pro-
ject beneficiaries, the local people affected by the project. It is also
acknowledged that, as some issues are embedded in the political deci-
sion-making processes of the DMC government, the role of the SPF may
be limited depending on the nature of the complaints. 95
Two principal issues relating to the SPF were its locus within the
new ADB Accountability Mechanism and the scope of the subject matter
of complaints that may be filed with it.'96With respect to the former,
ADB decided to place the consultation phase directly under Manage-
ment by striking a balance between the need for an objective, detached
perspective on a project and the need for sufficient knowledge of and
experience with bank operations. The rationale was that any complaint
of affected people will arise in the course of the formulation, processing,
or implementation of a project, and it is Management that is responsible
for all of these stages of the project cycle under the ADB Charter.' 97
Regarding the second issue of the subject matter of complaints, the fa-
miliar question of "domestic jurisdiction" surfaced, challenging the
scope of the SPF's competence. Many DMCs did not want the SPF to
probe into their areas of responsibility. Thus, the 2003 policy clearly
provided that "[t]he SPF will not interfere in the internal matters of any
DMC and will not mediate between the complainant and local authori-
ties."'98
The new ADB Accountability Mechanism places the consultation
phase between the complainant and the compliance review phase. The
194. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 29.
195. Id. 131.
196. Id. (H 29-36, 62-94.
197. ADB Charter, art. 34.5 ("The President shall be chief of the staff of the Bank and
shall conduct, under the direction of the Board of Directors, the current business of the
Bank."). Cf. Fukuda, supra note 56, at 35-36. See The Bank Information Center (USA) et al.,
Comments on the Working Paper of the ADB Inspection Function Review released February
21, 2003, (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/BICComments_
Inspection-3-11-03.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
198. New ADB Accountability Mechanism, supra note 16, 60.
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interests of economy and efficiency justify this structure, which ad-
dresses urgent claims of direct, material harm before the question of
compliance, which will remain irrespective of the resolution of the prob-
lem.
EBRD's Independent Recourse Mechanism also provides for both
problem-solving and compliance functions, though it houses them in one
unit. EBRD will, through its Compliance Coordination Officer (CCO) as
"co-ordinator," '99 receive a complaint and determine if the complaint is
eligible for "further processing."2°° Further, when making the eligibility
and compliance review assessment of the complaint, the CCO also con-
siders whether problem-solving techniques might be usefully employed
to resolve the issues underlying the complaint.0 ' The EBRD President
will decide whether any problem-solving initiative recommended by
CCO should be undertaken. 2 2 No single person can simultaneously dis-
pose of the question of eligibility for "further processing"20 3 of a
complaint after it has been registered and the question of compliance
review without being caught in a conflict of interest situation.
AfDB's Independent Review Mechanism is a combined compliance
review and problem-solving mechanism, consisting of a Compliance
Review and Mediation Unit (CRMU), headed by a Director, CRMU, and
a roster of three experts. The Director, CRMU, and two experts to be
identified by the Director constitute a compliance review panel.' 4 Upon
receipt of the complaint, the Director will conduct a preliminary review
to determine whether the request is "eligible for either a compliance
review or a problem-solving exercise. '2° AfDB's mechanism allows the
compliance review to be conducted by the compliance review panel and
the Director when the same Director has already determined whether the
case is "more appropriate for problem-solving or compliance review.' '2°6
B. Oversight Functions in the Implementation of Decisions
The World Bank Inspection Panel, IDB's IM, and ADB's 1995 In-
spection Function are not tasked to monitor the progress of
implementation of the recommendations adopted by the Board at the end
199. EBRD Independent Recourse Mechanism, supra note 54, T 6 of annex 1.
200. Id. T 12 of annex l.
201. "Such techniques may include independent fact-finding, mediation, conciliation,
dialogue facilitation, investigation and reporting." Id. T 27 of annex 1.
202. Id. T 27 of annex 1.
203. Id. 12 of annex l.
204. AfDB IRM Resolution, supra note 55, 22; AJDB IRM Operating Rules and Pro-
cedures, supra note 55, 45.
205. AfDB IRM Resolution, supra note 55, T 17; AfDB IRM Operating Rules and Pro-
cedures, supra note 55, 20.
206. AfDB IRM Operating Rules and Procedures, supra note 55, section 1(b).
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of the inspection process. In the World Bank's case, its argument is that
since these recommendations are prepared and submitted by Manage-
ment to the Board, the monitoring responsibility of implementation of
the recommendations squarely belongs to Management itself. Actually,
since these recommendations are made in response to the Inspection
Panel's report and findings, the monitoring responsibility should belong
to some other supervisory unit outside Management as per the Chorzow
principle. The MDB's monitoring of how its decisions are implemented
is part of the main task of international organizations "to supervise com-
pliance with their rules. 207 In the case of ADB, the monitoring vests in
the Compliance Review Panel (for implementation of Board decisions
following the outcome of a compliance review). In the case of EBRD, it
is the CCO who will monitor the implementation, or possibly an expert
whose recommendations have been approved by the President, the
Board, or another expert from the roster.208 In the case of AfDB, it is the
Director, CRMU, who monitors a problem-solving exercise and the Di-
209rector, CRMU, and an expert who monitor a compliance review.
MDBs" ° have shifted their focus to both problemsolving and compli-
ance review from simply investigating the compliance or noncompliance
of an MDB's operational activities. This move is in accord with the sub-
stantive principles behind empowering project-affected people to have
effective access to the problem-solving institution. The consultation
phase adds stability, power, and effectiveness to the mechanism designed
to enhance the institution's accountability and development effectiveness
on the ground.
C. The Need for Creativity in the Settlement
of a Private Party's Claim
More than two decades ago, Dr. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani warned:
"[T]he growth in the number of international claims has not been matched
by a comparable development in theory or in the articulation of general
policies to guide decision. The lag should be a cause of concern. Increases
in 10 activity can only lead to more claims-related problems. '1 ' The pro-
gressive development taking place in the structure of accountability
207. SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 29, § 1390.
208. EBRD Independent Recourse Mechanism, supra note 54, 26 of annex 1.
209. AJDB IRM Operating Rules and Procedures, supra note 55, In 40, 52(c)(iii).
210. In late 2003, IDB proposed a revision to its Independent Investigation Mechanism
to include a problem-solving/consultation function for its internal consultation. The IDB web-
site indicates in the third quarterly update of the 2005 Board work program that Board
consideration of a "Proposal for enhancements to the Independent Investigation Mechanism"
was scheduled for September 2005. See http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/iv/BOE-work.cfm?
language=English (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
211. Arsanjani, supra note 9, at 174.
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mechanisms established in MDBs notwithstanding, the mechanism of in-
spection or compliance review remains mostly a tool for enhancing
internal governance and accountability. A compliance review panel's sub-
stantive jurisdiction is limited to the review of compliance by an MDB. It
may take remedial action, but its competence does not extend to the mak-
ing of monetary indemnity or compensation for any material harm.
A corollary of the principle of responsibility is the principle of rem-
edy, and the most appropriate mode of settlement for MDBs (for claims
that cannot be settled by negotiation) is arbitration.1 2 There must be some
creative alternative to allow private parties' claims to be settled through
arbitration without jeopardizing the organizational effectiveness of MDBs.2131,
In the Bares case, the ADB Administrative Tribunal alluded to a possi-
bility of arbitration "to assess the international responsibility, tortious or
otherwise, of an international organization on the plane of public interna-
tional law' 21 4 as follows:
There was, of course, the theoretical possibility that the parties
might have agreed to resort to this Tribunal not as the Administra-
tive Tribunal of the Bank subject to its Statute but as a group of
individuals who, though happening to be the Members of the Tri-
bunal, have agreed, at the request and the consent of the parties
and, for the purposes of the particular proceedings, to act as a
special tribunal or arbitral body outside the scope of the Tribunal's
Statute."5
Each MDB has its administrative tribunal.2 6 One possibility is to de-
vise an appropriate passage for private parties' claims from an MDB's
compliance review phase to its administrative tribunal, which could be
metamorphosed as a special tribunal established at the request and consent
of the parties. An important consideration is that an MDB's functions and
purposes are delineated by the principle of specialty; member states invest
international organizations with certain powers, the limits of which are a
212. A proper forum for the settlement of any disputes between an MDB and its borrow-
ers, not resolved by negotiation, is arbitration as provided for in the applicable loan
regulations, so long as such disputes arise in connection with the performance of the loan or
guarantee agreement. In the case of member states, an MDB's charter provides, "Members
shall have recourse to such special procedures for the settlement of controversies between the
Bank and its members as may be prescribed in this Agreement, in the by-laws and regulation
of the Bank, or in contracts entered into with the Bank." ADB Charter, art. 50.2.
213. Bares, supra note 116.
214. Id. at 57, 17.
215. Id. at 56, 14.
216. For a discussion on different groups of international administrative tribunals and
recommendations, see Suzuki, supra note 29, at 205-07.
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function of their common interests.2 7 The principle of speciality supports
organizational effectiveness, and the need for organizational effectiveness
should determine the scope of how an MDB discharges its responsibility
and provides remedies in the settlement of private claims.
When the rights and interests of private individuals and groups con-
flict with those of international organizations through claims lodged
within an internal accountability mechanism or special tribunal, a recon-
figuration of authority and control over decisions of international
organizations inevitably occurs." 9 One guide for this reconfiguration is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which is customary in-
ternational law and has the attributes of jus cogens.22 As such, the human
rights provisions in the Universal Declaration are binding not only on
states but also on international organizations and "anyone whose choice
about an event can have some international significance., 22' Any one of
these international actors might be held affirmatively responsible for a par-
ticular violation of human rights. Viewed in this light, the accountability
mechanisms of MDBs are at the forefront of the development of the inter-
national law of human rights, which "depend[s] in no small measure upon
the ability of individuals and private groups to challenge unlawful
d • _ • ,,222
deprivations.
217. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, supra note 59, at 78, 25.
218. Arsanjani, supra note 9, at 174.
219. REISMAN, supra note 19, at 13.
220. On jus cogens, see BROWNLIE, supra note 80, at 488-90. See also McDOUGAL,
LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 18, at 339-50.
221. McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 21, at 2. Final Report, supra note 4, at 22-23
suggests that human rights obligations, apart from those that have attained the status of per-
emptory norms, can become binding upon international organizations in different ways, such
as the terms of their charters, as general principles of international law, or if the organization is
authorized to become a party to a human rights treaty.
222. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 18, at 279.
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